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derive a framework illustrating the ideal features of the entirety of management con-
trol systems in the setting of beyond budgeting, and then use it to compare the pro-
posals to the arrangements independently made by the case organizations outside the 
orbit of beyond budgeting advocates. The objective is thus to understand how organi-
zations use other management control systems to complement budgeting, and simul-
taneously to discuss the idealizations of beyond budgeting. 
The framework used in this study is built on the basis of Malmi and Brown’s (2008) 
conceptual typology of management control systems working as a package. The re-
viewed literature combines different streams of literature outside and within the field 
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Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on tarkastella, mitä yrityksen siirtyminen beyond 
budgeting -ajatteluun käytännössä tarkoittaa sekä arvioida sen periaatteiden käyttö-
kelpoisuutta talouden suunnittelussa. Tätä varten tutkimuksessa pyritään rakenta-
maan teoreettinen viitekehys kuvaamaan johdon ohjausjärjestelmien kokonaisuuden 
ideaalia beyond budgetingin suositusten valossa. Lisäksi tutkielmassa vertaillaan kah-
den beyond budgetingista ulkopuolisen case -yrityksen budjetointikäytäntöjä ja tarkas-
tellaan niistä tehtyjen havaintojen avulla kriittisesti beyond budgetingin periaatteita. 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on siis ymmärtää, kuinka yritykset käyttävät ohjausjärjestel-
miään budjetointiprosessiensa tukemisessa. 
Tutkielmassa käytetty viitekehys rakennetaan käyttäen Malmin ja Brownin (2008) 
laatimaa ohjausjärjestelmien kokonaisuuden käsitteistöä. Kirjallisuuskatsaus yhdiste-
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Toisaalta, yksikään tarkasteltu ohjausjärjestelmien kokonaisuus ei täysin vastannut 
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1. I
TRODUCTIO
 
Budgets play a central role in the management control processes of most contemporary 
organizations (Østergren, Stensaker, 2011). Indeed, even though originally being devel-
oped to be used only as a tool for controlling costs (Hope and Fraser, 2003), the budget-
ary framework is nowadays considered to be more strategically focused and it is used to 
accommodate a wide range of other tasks too (Hansen et al., 2003). Therefore it is not 
surprising to find, that organizations are annually spending huge amounts of resources 
to produce them (e.g. Åkerberg, 2006). 
However, budgets have been commonly criticized for not being able to meet the re-
quirements set by the volatile operating environment of today (e.g. Hope et al., 2011; 
Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). Budgets are for example 
accused of being exposed to dysfunctional game-playing, data manipulation, and strate-
gic short-termism. They are also seen to restrict organization’s knowledge sharing 
through the reinforcement of departmental barriers, and to prevent other more sophisti-
cated strategy tools from reaching their full power. For example, Hope and Fraser (2003) 
argue that the commonly implemented balanced scorecards are in reality often con-
strained by the budgets that are actually running the business. In general, budgets are 
seen to add only little value, given the time that is required to prepare them (Neely et al., 
2003).  
To solve the budget-related problems, different kind of alternatives for process im-
provements have been proposed; activity based-, rolling-, and zero-based budgets all 
have received a great deal of attention in the academia (e.g. Hansen et al., 2003). Yet, 
while these methods all have their commonly acknowledged strengths, there are authors 
arguing that they do not provide unquestionable answers to the problems (Neely et al., 
2003). On the other hand, some authors (e.g. Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012) have 
tried to combine the best parts of these different alternatives and proposed a budgeting 
model that comprises all the mentioned methods with different time perspectives to be 
updated regularly during the year, but at the same time ignore the huge workload that 
the operation of such model would cause in practice.  
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The most radical suggestion to overcome the budget-related problems is regarded to be 
the beyond budgeting movement, where instead of only altering, companies are encour-
aged to move ‘beyond’ the budgets. According to its advocates, the main idea is to use 
the twelve proposed key principles to replace the budgetary control with organizational 
responsiveness, and thereby adjust the organization’s management processes and organ-
izational structures to respond to the needs set by the environment of today (Hope and 
Fraser, 2003). After few years of hiatus, this movement has recently received an in-
creasing amount of attention as some large companies have started to move beyond the 
budgets and report positive outcomes. Perhaps the most commonly referred recent 
adopter is Statoil, which is one of the world’s biggest oil and gas producers (Banham, 
2012). Other well-known associates include companies such as Ahlsell, Google, 
Handelsbanken, and Toyota (BBRT.org).  
However, despite the increased attention, the beyond budgeting movement has received 
only a limited amount of independent academic studies compared to other management 
accounting innovations, and therefore many of the related issues remain unclear (Becker 
et al., 2010). First of all, most of the studies supporting the concept are done by man-
agement consultants and tend to overoptimistically promise numerous enduring im-
provements all around the organization (e.g. Hope and Fraser, 2003; Hope and Fraser, 
2003b; Player, 2003; Hansen, 2011). These promises include for example higher profits, 
huge cost savings, better motivated and innovative employees, more ethical reporting, 
and more loyal customers. Another problem is the fact that the literature promoting the 
concept focuses on analyzing the practices of explicit adopters, and thereby aims to il-
lustrate the feasibility of the ideas with the help of exemplar companies (e.g. 
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Østergren and Stensaker 2011; Bogsnes, 2009). Indeed, 
it can be argued that as the principles of beyond budgeting have originally been derived 
from the best practices of real-world organizations operating without budgets, studying 
the practices of those same companies may result in making paradoxal conclusions. 
Moreover, the literature (e.g. Hope and Fraser, 2003) tends to make comparisons to 
such organizations that strictly follow the practices of traditional annual budgets, imply-
ing an assumption that companies are unable to independently develop their processes. 
However, in reality the situation is not that straightforward as for example Libby and 
Lindsay (2010) found that 94% of the mid- to large-sized North-American companies 
using budgets for control were planning to find ways for process improvements. 
  
 
3 
 
On the other hand, also the criticism related to the beyond budgeting often lack detailed 
analysis of the real implications, and the concept is often rejected based on only slight 
arguments (e.g. Becker et al, 2010; Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012; Shaw, 2007). 
More precisely, the opponents of beyond budgeting argue that the problems of budget-
ing in general are exaggerated and that companies are using budgets for other reasons 
than what the advocates propose (e.g. Sivabalan et al., 2009). It is also argued that be-
yond budgeting would be suitable only for companies with unlimited resources 
(Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012) that are operating in stable industries (Libby and 
Lindsay, 2010). Moreover, Rickards (2006) considers beyond budgeting to support total 
management action freedom and hence concludes that no company can operate without 
control. Finally, the fact that only a small minority of organizations is reported be plan-
ning to follow the example of the few beyond budgeting adopters is often considered to 
demonstrate the unfeasibility of the ideas in practice (e.g. Libby and Lindsay, 2010). 
As the discussion surrounding the concept lacks objectivity and is such diverse and con-
flicting, the means and real implications of moving beyond the budgets have remained 
unclear. Similarly it is unknown how radical the journey would be and whether the im-
plementation would help to solve the proposed budget-related problems. This is despite 
the fact that academia acknowledges the importance of critically examining the implica-
tions of such latest consultancy views (e.g. Vaivio, 2008), and there is a general call for 
concrete and more comprehensive understanding of beyond budgeting and its relation to 
organizational practices (e.g. Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). The same demand regards 
also other strategic management accounting techniques presented in the literature, as 
many of these innovations are argued to be implemented in practice only infrequently 
(Langfield-Smith, 2008; Seal, 2010).  
1.1. Research objectives 
This study aims to objectively examine what moving beyond budgeting really means, 
and estimate the feasibility and radicalism of the proposed actions with the help of two 
Finnish publicly listed case companies. In other words, the aim is to first derive a lucid 
framework from the literature that illustrates the ideal features of beyond budgeting, and 
then compare the proposals to the arrangements independently made by the case organi-
zations outside the orbit of beyond budgeting advocates. Thus, in contrast to the general 
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tradition of illustrative beyond budgeting research, the case companies of this study are 
not part of the beyond budgeting movement. The objective is to understand how the 
organizations use other management control systems to complement their budgeting 
processes and simultaneously to discuss the idealizations of beyond budgeting in rela-
tion to the organizational reality.  
The discussion of the idealizations is further enriched by combining the existing case 
descriptions of the beyond budgeting practices used in Statoil to the analysis. The aim is 
to find out whether the explicit beyond budgeting adopter is really capable to meet the 
ideals suggested in the literature, and simultaneously to analyze the reasons behind the 
possible differences. Indeed, it is expected that the comparison of the organization-
specific differences could provide some interesting insights to the discussion related to 
the issue of beyond budgeting not receiving further interest neither among the academia 
nor practice. 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the implications, the topic is con-
nected to the diverse literature related to the management control systems (MCS). This 
is done as Hope and Fraser (2003) underline that beyond budgeting strives for coher-
ence in the requirements of company’s strategy, management processes, culture, and 
leadership style, which all can be considered to be essential parts of the entirety of man-
agement control systems (e.g. Ferreira and Otley, 2009). The chosen approach can also 
be justified as studying the control mechanisms in isolation from the other parts of the 
system are known to increase the risk of making incorrect conclusions as all the inter-
links are not properly recognized (Chenhall, 2003). For example, following the notion 
of Malmi and Brown (2008), a study might conclude some specific management inno-
vation to be effective even though in reality it might still be the traditional budget that is 
driving the performance. The holistic approach also provides an opportunity for this 
study to combine the budgeting research across three theoretical perspectives of social 
science in which the research has tended to be grown apart: economics, psychology, and 
sociology. While the economic perspective on budgeting focuses on the agency-
theoretic alignment of the interests of owners and employees, examines the psychology-
based budgeting research the effects of budgeting on individuals’ mental states, behav-
ior, and performance. Finally, the sociology perspective studies how organizational 
structure and processes serve to influence the employees. (Covaleski et al., 2003)  
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Hence, this study aims to address the following research questions:  
 
1) What are the ideal features of an organization’s entirety of management control 
systems in the existence of beyond budgeting? 
 
2) What arrangements have the case companies independently made to their control 
systems in order to mitigate the budget-related problems? 
 
Much attention is paid on the literature review in order to avoid the problem addressed 
by Vaivio (2008), where a framework fails to give focus and guidance for the qualita-
tive fieldwork. Therefore the literature that will be examined covers extensively the 
published articles, books, and case descriptions related to beyond budgeting. On the 
other hand, as there are studies that have identified a gap between the different streams 
of control-related literature (e.g. Nixon and Burns, 2005), relevant information is also 
searched with a broader scope by examining publications not directly connected to be-
yond budgeting. Similarly, the empirical case analysis aims to offer rich understanding 
of the organizational practices in use, in order to accommodate proper basis for further 
discussion.  
As the topic of this study is rather broad, it is important to outline the objectives with 
the following remarks. First of all, the aim of this study is not to give any opinions or 
managerial recommendations regarding the practices currently used in the case compa-
nies. Indeed, the interviews are only used for analyzing the applicability of the ideas of 
beyond budgeting. Secondly, the aim is not to give any specific comments regarding the 
truthfulness of the promised benefits that are available when moving beyond the budg-
ets. Naturally, opinions regarding the rationality of the ideas in general are given though. 
Nevertheless, despite the principles of beyond budgeting impacting organizations on 
various different levels and being therefore challenging to comprehensively understand, 
the approach of studying the implications to the management control system interrela-
tions has previously remained largely unexplored. Hence, this study takes first steps 
towards the explicit connection of the two streams of literature. This is surprising as the 
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implementation is generally acknowledged to require analyzing a whole set of controls, 
and a call for this kind of approach exists (e.g. Østergren and Stensaker 2011; 
Blumentritt, 2006). On the other hand, there is also a call for better understanding on 
how organizations use other management control systems to complement budgeting (e.g. 
Sivabalan et al., 2009), and the managerial relevance of such study has been acknowl-
edged. 
1.2. Structure of the study 
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, the suggested reasons 
for budget use and the related problems are being reviewed in Chapter 2. This is done in 
order to understand the tasks that beyond budgeting should be capable to address and 
improve. In chapter 3, the framework illustrating the ideal features of an organization’s 
entirety of management control systems in the existence of beyond budgeting is being 
built. Chapter 4 describes the financial planning practices used in Statoil, based on the 
existing case descriptions available. Chapter 5 discusses the methodological foundations 
of this study and introduces the case companies whose practices are under the analysis 
in chapter 6. Chapter 7 sets the empirical observations against the developed framework, 
as a comparative analysis between the ideal features of beyond budgeting and the prac-
tices used in each of the reviewed companies is being done. The chapter ends with dis-
cussion related to the observed weaknesses and paradoxes of beyond budgeting. Finally, 
chapter 8 summarizes the key findings of this study and discusses the theoretical contri-
bution of the observations. Also the limitations regarding the research design are being 
addressed, and avenues for future studies suggested.   
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2. BUDGETI
G  
The need for management control has traditionally been illustrated through the Agency 
theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), which examines a relationship where a principal 
hires an agent to perform services on his behalf. In the context of organization’s internal 
activities, the principal refers to the top management, whereas the agent refers to the 
lower level management (Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). Control systems are needed 
to ensure that the agent is acting in accordance to the principal’s interests and to de-
crease the risk of moral hazard.  
Budgets are the tools that have traditionally been used for such control purposes in most 
of the organizations, and therefore in order to understand the requirements and the need 
for an alternative control system, the reasons and related problems for budget use are 
now being reviewed. The chapter ends with the introduction of the beyond budgeting 
principles.  
2.1. Reasons to budget 
During the years, numerous of academic researchers and practitioners have given their 
opinions about the most important reasons for the use of budgets (e.g. Hilton et al., 2006; 
Sivabalan et al., 2009; Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Hansen, 2011). Some of the research-
ers study the reasons more broadly (e.g. Hansen, 2011), while others aim to analyze the 
topic more in detail (e.g. Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012) and with different em-
phasis. This is natural as there is no universal format for budget design that could be 
applied everywhere, and therefore each organization should design its budgeting system 
to focus on the most important issues to that particular organization (Hansen, 2011). 
Regardless of the tradeoffs made in the design of such system, budgets are in general 
described to provide a framework where the different activities of an organization are 
compressed into a set of financial statements (Otley, 1999).  
2.1.1. The periodic breakdown 
As all researchers tend to emphasize different tasks, this study summarizes the main 
reasons for budgeting through its role in the different phases of a general business pro-
  
 
 
cess. Following the study of
intra-period, and post-period. 
 
Figure 1: Periodic breakdown of 
 
The pre-period phase refers to 
(Hansen, 2011). More specifically, budgets are proposed to be used for (1) the deleg
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ing reasons for the divergences are determined so that the business activities can be con-
trolled and harmonized (Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012). 
In the post-period phase, the focus of budgeting is on performance evaluation. More 
specifically, Sivabalan et al. (2009) subcategorize the evaluation function into staff 
evaluation and business unit evaluation. As the incentives of the employees can be tied 
to the attainment of the budgets, Hilton et al. (2006) and Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė 
(2012) attach also staff motivation to the evaluation function, which is a inclusion that 
seems to be logical as the budget-based incentive contracts are commonly used in prac-
tice (Fisher et al., 2003; Gary, 2003).  
2.1.2. Other reasons 
Finally, there are also other reasons for the budget use that cannot be categorized under 
only one of the phases. First of them is communication, which refers to the facilitation 
of the flow of information to guide the employees to strive towards a common goal 
(Hilton et al., 2006). Indeed, through the resource allocation decisions, budgets can be 
for example used to stimulate certain type of behavior (Sivabalan et al., 2009) and to 
communicate business strategies and long-term plans (Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 
2012). In fact, Libby and Lindsay (2010) found that North-American companies find 
budgeting as the most important mean for implementing business unit strategy. Moreo-
ver, Rickards (2006) notes that in addition to internal communication, budgets are also 
used to fulfill the information need of external parties, such as banks and investors.   
Secondly, Marginson and Ogden (2005) argue that managers confronted with ambiguity 
in their work may perceive positively the structure and certainty offered by traditional 
budgets. Thus, in the absence of clear-cut goals, budgets provide clear objectives for 
managers to be used when directing subordinates in accordance to the directive path-
goal theory of financial controls.  
2.1.3. Discussion 
In their survey, Sivabalan et al. (2009) found that organizations consider planning 
(=pre-period), control (=intra-period), and evaluation (=post-period) reasons all to be 
important, even though planning and control reasons are regarded to be more important 
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than evaluation reasons. However, the post-period reasons should not be underestimated 
as Libby and Lindsay (2010) found that as many as 79% of the mid- to large-sized 
North-American companies use budgeting for managerial motivation and performance 
evaluation. Nevertheless, as Hansen et al. (2003) argue, the usefulness of budgets as a 
control mechanism is dependent on the stability of operating environment and the quali-
ty of the predictive models in use, and therefore excessive generalizations of the relative 
importance should be avoided. 
2.2. Problems of budgeting 
Despite the widespread use of budgets, the related problems have been acknowledged 
and discussed for years (e.g. Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Merchant, 1985). In general, the 
literature related to the criticism against budgeting can be roughly divided into two main 
groups; while others argue that the use of budgets is fundamentally defective, others 
argue that the problems emerge only because of the way that budgets are used. Never-
theless, there is also a strong dissatisfaction among the organizations as most of the 
companies using budgets for control are planning to improve the process. (Libby and 
Lindsay, 2010) In this study, the most commonly proposed budget-related problems are 
classified into three categories. 
2.2.1. Game-playing 
Using budgets as a strategic tool provokes employees to engage in dysfunctional game-
playing (Hansen et al., 2003; Neely et al., 2003), where the budgeted numbers can be 
manipulated to be more favorable for some of the parties involved (Libby and Lindsay, 
2010). Hope and Fraser (2003) list six typical harmful ways to game the numbers to be: 
(1) negotiating lowest targets and highest rewards, (2) focusing only on achieving the 
financial targets, not on the customer satisfaction, (3) never providing accurate forecasts, 
(4) asking more resources than what is really needed, (5) not exceeding the targets, and 
(6) always spending the whole budget in order to avoid losing the resources in the next 
period. Other typical examples of behavior of this kind include spending money before 
getting approvals and shifting the money between different accounts to avoid budget 
overruns (Simons, 1995).  
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Libby and Lindsay (2010) found that deferring necessary expenditures to future periods 
and negotiating easier targets by “sandbagging” are the most common ways of budget 
gaming, and reported to occur almost in every organization. Thereby it should be very 
common that the budgets become misleading when used in operational planning as the 
numbers cannot be trusted to reflect the best knowledge. On the other hand, when the 
budgets are used to evaluate performance, the managers get compensated and credited 
for questionable merits.  
2.2.2. Time-related issues 
Budgets have also commonly been criticized for being too time-consuming to produce 
(e.g. Neely et al., 2003; Libby and Lindsay, 2010). The budgeting process, where multi-
ple rounds of negotiating and agreeing upon the numbers are made in different organi-
zational levels, usually begins already several months prior to the year which it relates 
to (Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Gary, 2003). As companies have increased the frequency 
of their budgeting in order to increase the accuracy of the forecasts in the altering envi-
ronment, the workload has increased to even greater extent (Hope and Fraser, 2003). 
And when the employees and managers need to spend so much time on budgeting it 
naturally decreases the time that they have available for running the actual business. 
Problem is that despite the large amount of resources that are used to produce the budg-
ets, the majority of organizations still acknowledge that predicting the external changes 
is difficult and find budgets quickly to become outdated (Libby and Lindsay, 2009). The 
organizations are hence professed to be inflexible and unable to foresee the changes 
lying in the environment.  
2.2.3. Strategic issues 
Another common argument against the use of traditional budgets is that they often tend 
to be unaligned with the company’s strategy, as the focus is only on the following year 
(Neely et al., 2003). Indeed, strategic issues usually have longer perspective, and as the 
managers are trying only to meet the yearly budgets, they easily forget the strategic con-
siderations (Hope and Fraser, 2003). Thus, despite the chosen strategic direction, budg-
ets are seen to strengthen vertical control and thereby constrain the responsiveness of an 
organization. The increased verticality, for one, reinforces departmental barriers and 
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restricts knowledge sharing (Neely et al., 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that even 
though an organization should be strategically forward-looking, the budgets are typical-
ly based on the numbers of the previous years (Hope and Fraser, 2003), and therefore 
their usage is sometimes compared to driving a car by looking through the rear view 
mirror (Otley, 1999).  
Budgets are also being accused of directing the resources only for the best projects with-
in the divisions, instead of the best projects in the whole organization (Hope et al., 2011) 
and to restrict the drive for constant improvement (Libby and Lindsay, 2010), innova-
tion, and learning (Marginson and Ogden, 2005). Finally, Østergren and Stensaker 
(2011) address the possibility of a division perversely being credited for obtaining lower 
costs than targeted, while simultaneously failing to meet its sales targets.  
2.3. In the search of a solution 
Different kind of alternatives to improve budgeting and to overcome the related prob-
lems has been introduced. Such propositions include concepts such as activity based 
budgeting, rolling budgeting and zero-based budgeting. However, it is also commonly 
argued that these models have not been able to give complete solutions to the problems. 
(Neely et al., 2003) Rolling forecast for example is produced periodically during the 
year to reflect the existing market realities. The more accurate numbers increase manag-
ers’ trust on the budgets to be used in operational planning, but on the other hand, prob-
lems related to the performance evaluation and goal congruence increase as the con-
stantly changing performance targets are difficult to understand (Sivabalan et al., 2009). 
Against this view, it is no surprise that budgets still play a central role in the manage-
ment control processes of most organizations (Østergren, Stensaker, 2011) and that 
companies tend to continue the use of traditional annual budgets as a primary planning 
tool (Shastri and Stout, 2008). There are also researchers still finding traditional budgets 
to be vital for any organization (e.g. Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Stevens, 2004).  
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2.3.1. Beyond budgeting 
A completely different stream of literature believes that the budgets are fundamentally 
flawed, and argue that instead of only improving, companies should move beyond them 
(Hansen et al., 2003). This movement is called ‘beyond budgeting’ and it aims to max-
imize operational performance through the adjustment of management processes and 
organizational structures to better respond to the needs of contemporary organizations 
(Hope and Fraser, 2003). In other words, the question is not only about abandoning tra-
ditional budgeting, but also about using the concept to force organizations to examine 
and rethink their current management control practices in general. After being originally 
introduced in the beginning of the 2000’s (Hope and Fraser, 2003), this ideology has 
recently received an increasing amount of attention (e.g. Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 
2013; Østergren and Stensaker, 2011).  
The concept of beyond budgeting was originally created by an organization known as 
Beyond Budgeting Roundtable (BBRT), founded by the US-based research and devel-
opment organization called Consortium for Advanced Manufacturing International 
(CAM-I) (Becker et al., 2010). The members of BBRT involve academic researchers, 
consultants, and organizations that all are interested in operating without budgets. The 
idea is to transfer the knowledge from both academia to practitioners and also reversely 
from practitioners to academia (Libby and Lindsay, 2010). This setting seems to be rea-
sonable as budgeting can be considered to be a socio-technical artifact, which Berry et 
al. (2009) define to be an embodiment of both theory and practice.   
Usually the journey towards beyond budgeting is described to be a two-step process. 
The first step is to update the budgeting practices and introduce new adaptive processes 
making the performance management more relevant to its users, and to reduce the costs 
of budgeting. The second step is to support the achieved results with radical decentrali-
zation of organizational structures. The two-staged process has been illustrated through 
twelve principles that have been updated several times during the past ten years. (Player, 
2003; Hope and Fraser, 2003; Hansen, 2003) The current set of principles is shown in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1: Principles of beyond budgeting (Hope et al., 2011) 
1. Values 
Bind people to a common cause,  
not a central plan 
2. Governance 
Govern through shared values and sound judgment,  
not detailed rules and regulations 
3. Transparency 
Make information open and transparent,  
don’t restrict and control it 
4. Teams 
Organize around a seamless network of accountable teams, 
not centralized functions 
5. Trust 
Trust teams to regulate their performance,  
don’t micro-manage them  
6. Accountability 
Base accountability on holistic criteria and peer reviews,  
not on hierarchical relationships 
7. Goals 
Set ambitious medium-term goals,  
not short-term fixed targets 
8. Rewards 
Base rewards on relative performance, 
not on meeting fixed targets 
9. Planning 
Make planning a continuous and inclusive process, 
not a top-down annual event 
10. Coordination 
Coordinate interactions dynamically, 
not through annual budgets 
11. Resources 
Make resources available just-in-time, 
not just-in-case 
12. Controls 
Base controls on fast, frequent feedback,  
not budget variances 
 
 
In general, the principles can be summarized to support empowerment, use of relative 
benchmarked measures, and free flow of information. However, it can be argued that 
even though some of the principles are more explicit than others, the list in general fails 
to give very concrete instructions for the abandonment of budgets. And despite the at-
tempts of BBRT to update the principles during the past years, the overall message has 
remained confusing.  
2.3.2. Related contradictions 
Perhaps due to this ambiguity, the concept has received a lot of criticism and the aca-
demia is far from being unanimous when it comes to the applicability of beyond budget-
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ing. First of all, the idea of operating without budgets often evokes suspects that com-
panies would lose control over their operations. For example, Rickards (2006) states 
that beyond budgeting is based on total management action freedom and therefore it is 
not suitable to be used for control purposes. Similarly Otley (1999) doubts that an or-
ganization could survive without the existence of traditional budgetary tools, even if it 
would be using other modern performance management tools such as balanced score-
cards in its operations. On his more recent publications, Otley (2008) also argues that 
beyond budgeting lacks the way of maintaining a holistic overview that traditional 
budgeting system is capable to provide.  
Secondly, beyond budgeting is seen to be suitable for only a limited number of compa-
nies. For example, Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė (2012) argue that as beyond budget-
ing’s implementation costs are higher compared to only updating the existing budgeting 
system, it can be used only in a small number of large companies who have enough 
money for the implementation. On the other hand, Libby and Lindsay (2010) limit the 
range of suitable companies even more when they argue that the principles of beyond 
budgeting can only be used in stable industries; the authors underline that the exemplar 
companies of beyond budgeting do not operate on businesses where organizations need 
to adapt quickly. Similarly Rickards (2006) argue that beyond budgeting is not suitable 
for manufacturing companies as in those companies resources must be planned already 
in advance, and operating without budgets would lead to resource scarcity or overstock.  
Finally, perhaps the most typical skeptical comment regarding beyond budgeting relates 
to its low popularity in general. For example Neely et al. (2003) admit that only a few 
companies have truly been able to go beyond budgeting despite many taking steps to-
wards it. Similarly also Libby and Lindsay (2010) doubt that budgets would be funda-
mentally flawed as there are a lot of successful companies still using budgets. However, 
it can be argued that this logic would basically reject every innovation as they are al-
ways something that has not previously been done. Moreover, as there are successful 
companies among the beyond budgeting adopters too, it can be concluded that the exist-
ing financial planning practices are not the only divers behind the success of a company. 
Anyway, due to the numerous contradictions surrounding the discussion, more compre-
hensive understanding of beyond budgeting is needed.  
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3.1. Planning 
In the typology of Malmi and Brown (2008), planning refers to the goal- and standard 
setting done ex-ante in an organization to direct and guide the employee behavior. Set-
ting and aligning the targets and goals across the different functional areas to be in line 
with each other clarifies the behavior that is expected from the employees. While action 
planning focuses on tactical issues related on the period of the following year, long 
range planning emphasizes strategic issues with longer perspective. Like shown in 
chapter 2, budgeting is usually regarded to play a major role in the planning phase and 
hence its abandonment should have several important implications for this control. 
Therefore the study of Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) who attach budgeting direct-
ly to the planning control is now followed, despite Malmi and Brown (2008) originally 
separating budgeting from planning in their typology.  
3.1.1. Separation of target setting and planning 
One crucial difference to Malmi and Brown’s (2008) conceptualization of planning is 
that according to the beyond budgeting ideology, target setting and planning should be 
separated from each other (Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). This is done in order to in-
crease the accuracy of the forecasts to reflect the best organizational knowledge of the 
future, as the numbers are not subject to dysfunctional gaming behavior anymore. In 
other words, when there are no connections to performance evaluation, there are no in-
centives to game the numbers and hence planning becomes no longer distorted because 
of wishful thinking and target negotiations (Hope et al., 2011). In the existence of tradi-
tional budgets, the numbers are the same for both targets and forecasts (Bourmistrov 
and Kaarbøe, 2013). 
The target setting process should focus only on the targets and not on the resources that 
might be needed, nor the means to reach the targets. In other words, target-setting 
should be only about clarifying where the company is heading (Bourmistrov and 
Kaarbøe, 2013). Goals should be strategic and set ambitiously relative to either external 
benchmarks or internal peers, depending where to find comparable targets (Hope et al., 
2011). In other words, instead of setting fixed targets based on the budgeted numbers, 
the managers should focus on relative key performance indicators such as return on eq-
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uity and cost-to-income ratios (Player, 2003).  According to the advocates, this kind of 
relative improvement contract should stimulate to continuous performance improve-
ment as managers must endlessly continue striving for better results compared to their 
benchmarks or peers. Setting stretchable goals also lightens the process of target setting 
as relative measures do not need to be reset as often as the absolute year-end targets. 
Similarly, as the focus is on the big numbers instead of assessment at detailed level, the 
workload is expected to decrease. (Østergren and Stensaker, 2011; Hope and Fraser, 
2003; Simons 1995)  
The planning process should then focus only on how to reach the ambitious goals set 
earlier in the target setting process (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). This refers to the 
decisions related to the pre-phase tasks of budgeting, such as delegation of duties and 
management of production capacity (e.g. Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012; 
Sivabalan et al., 2009). While the targets are set at higher levels in the organization, the 
plans should be developed at lower levels. In other words, the means for reaching tar-
gets is decentralized to be developed within the boundaries set by the targets (Østergren 
and Stensaker, 2011). Top management should implement a coach-and-support way of 
leading and intervene in operations only if the decentralized managers are unable to 
solve a problem, or request support (Richards, 2006). Similarly also Schonberger (1996) 
argues that formal top-down planning is an impediment for developing best possible 
operations. To underline this separation, the target-setting process can for example take 
place already early in the spring, whereas planning is not done until the autumn 
(Østergren and Stensaker, 2011).  
According to the beyond budgeting philosophy, planning should be done with the help 
of rolling forecasts, which are updated usually quarterly and always cover the same pe-
riod. In other words, the scope of forecasts does not shorten towards the year-end and 
does not envision a fixed end at the end of the fiscal year, as traditional budgets do. 
Rolling forecasts should include only few key variables to minimize the workload, but 
as they are updated regularly the increased accuracy is ensured. (Hope et al., 2011) The 
use of rolling forecasts makes the planning to be more flexible to respond to the changes 
in the environment (Max, 2005). Finally, Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) underline 
the importance to understand that in the setting of beyond budgeting, the aim of fore-
casting is to find the gaps between the targets and plans, and thereby provide infor-
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mation about the required changes. In the setting of traditional budgeting, the forecasts 
are synonymous with plans.  
3.1.2. Allocation of resources 
Like shown earlier, also the allocation of resources is one important task traditionally 
done with the help of budgets in the pre-period phase, and therefore now discussed un-
der the planning controls (Sivabalan et al., 2009; Hilton et al., 2006). Malmi and Brown 
(2008) underline that in the context of management control systems, it is important to 
understand whether planning is done to decide on future activities or whether it involves 
committing employees to the organizational targets. Therefore the focus now is on the 
process of resource allocation that affects the behavior of the employees and not on the 
allocation decisions per se.   
According to the beyond budgeting principles, resources should not be allocated on a 
yearly basis, but instead continuously following a centrally planned just-in-time ideolo-
gy (Hope et al., 2011, Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). In other words, a central com-
mittee should be formed to actively manage the resource portfolio and to evaluate the 
projects individually through a common set of qualitative and quantitative criteria. A 
well-functioning information system plays a crucial role here as it provides information 
about where the business is accelerating and where cooling off (Banham, 2012). This 
arrangement is done in order to ensure financing to be given for the overall best projects 
in the organization, not just for the best projects within a division. Managerial focus is 
directed to emphasize continuous search of good projects, and the problem of necessary 
projects being rejected due to the budget constraints of the business units, is removed 
(Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). Also the problematic issue of business units approv-
ing their projects only to spend the whole budget in order to avoid losing the resources 
in the next period is mitigated (Hope et al., 2011).  
Another suggested feature of beyond budgeting in this context relates to the acquire-
ment of back office functions through internal markets. Thus, instead of being cost cen-
ters, the support functions become profit centers whose resources the operating units 
can acquire at an agreed price. The idea is to put the back office functions under market 
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pressure and simultaneously ensure that the cost allocation is based on causalities. 
(Hope et al., 2011)   
3.2. Cybernetic control and rewarding 
Cybernetic control in Malmi and Brown’s (2008) typology can be described as a feed-
back system built to measure performance. According to the authors, it can be regarded 
either as an information system or as a part of the control system package, depending on 
the way it is used. If the behavior of the employees is linked to the targets and the re-
vealing variances, the cybernetic system becomes a part of the MCS package. The four 
basic cybernetic systems that are included in the typology are: (1) budgets, (2) financial 
measures, (3) non-financial measures, and (4) hybrids. (Malmi and Brown, 2008)  
Reward and compensation controls are usually closely linked to cybernetic controls as 
they refer to systems built to motivate the employees and to align the goals of their ac-
tivities into those of the organization (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). However, Malmi and 
Brown (2008) have separated them in their typology because they acknowledge that 
there are also other reasons for the compensation schemes to exist, such as employee 
retaining and encouragement of cultural control. Despite this separation, these two con-
trols are now discussed together as the beyond budgeting principles do not give any 
specific recommendations related to those other reasons of rewarding, and the principles 
regarding these two controls are similar. Whereas planning control refers to the pre-
period phase, cybernetic control and rewarding refer to post-period phase of budgeting, 
as the focus is now on the performance evaluation.  
3.2.1. Use of relative indicators and benchmarks 
According to the beyond budgeting principles 7 and 8, the performance management 
process of an organization should be based on relative improvement contracts rather 
than on fixed targets (Hope et al., 2011). Additionally, the evaluation should be about 
benchmarking key performance dimensions against competitors or peers (Hansen et al., 
2003). These KPIs should be both financial and non-financial, and should transparently 
reflect the company’s existing medium-term strategic goals (Chenhall, 2008; Hope and 
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Fraser, 2003b). The use of Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) balanced scorecard is recom-
mended in order to find the appropriate indicators (Neely et al., 2003).  
The main benefit that the use of relative indicators and benchmarking is argued to offer 
is that they stimulate the employees to strive for continuous performance improvement. 
Because even though the managers do know what KPIs they are evaluated against, in 
the absence of absolute numbers they cannot know what is enough and what is not. This 
should reduce the amount of gaming behavior where for example available profits are 
reserved to next year (Hope and Fraser, 2003b). On the other hand, relative contracts 
make rewarding principles to become more accurate and better based on causalities as 
no manager is rewarded on a basis of good budget negotiating skills or market upturns 
anymore. This is currently a common problem, as there are studies showing that the link 
between executive compensation and firm performance is not very straightforward in 
practice (e.g. Ozkan, 2011). Vice versa, relative indicators also enable well-performing 
managers to be acknowledged even when the markets are going down in general, if they 
just perform better than their competitors or peers (Hope and Fraser, 2003). In other 
words, relative indicators take into account the two different elements of organization’s 
demand that Hansen (2011) defines to be generated by either macroeconomic factors or 
the actions of the salespersons. 
Some authors (e.g. Baker et al., 1994; Hansen et al., 2003; Chenhall, 2008) also recom-
mend basing the rewards partially on subjective evaluation in order to encourage em-
ployees to take strategic initiatives and to capture the long-term opportunities that 
benchmarking alone does not fully support. Similar view is also taken by Neely et al. 
(2003) who note that the benefits of investments often lag.  
3.2.2. Group incentives and non-financial rewarding 
In the context of beyond budgeting it is necessary to consider rewarding similarly to 
Sivabalan et al. (2009) who distinguish staff evaluation and business unit evaluation 
from each other: according to the ideology, rewarding should collectively involve teams 
instead of giving bonuses to individuals (Hope et al., 2011; Hansen et al., 2003). The 
potential benefits of the group incentives are also acknowledged among the studies out-
side the discussion related to beyond budgeting (e.g. Drake et al., 1999). Also Berry et 
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al. (2009) conclude that many organizations have found collaborative relationships to 
foster better performance and therefore the aim should be at creating a workplace where 
everyone is working towards the same goal, instead of competing with each other.   
Finally, the advocates of beyond budgeting underline the importance of using non-
financial rewarding practices to motivate the employees. Indeed, Hope et al. (2011) un-
derline that employee recognition is often more powerful way to motivate the employ-
ees than pure financial compensation. They even argue that financial incentives are not 
necessarily needed at all. However, it should be reminded that the strength of non-
financial incentives vary a lot from country to country and therefore these issues should 
be carefully considered in the context of organizations’ culture and environment.  
3.3. Administrative controls 
The design and monitoring of working processes is a typical way to control the behavior 
of employees (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). Malmi and Brown (2008) use the term 
‘administrative controls’ to refer to the arrangements of organizational structure and 
liability distribution. In their typology, employee behavior can be affected through (1) 
the organization design and structure, (2) governance structures within the firm, and (3) 
the procedures and policies that has been set. The governance structure refers to the 
level of bureaucracy within the organization, while the procedures and policies deter-
mine the standards for behavior. While organizational design is often regarded as given, 
Malmi and Brown (2008) consider it to be an important control device that is under the 
control of the managers. 
The adoption of beyond budgeting has a strong impact on administrative controls, as an 
essential part of the ideology deals with radical decentralization and empowerment. It 
means authorizing employees at different levels to make the decisions independently in 
accordance to the company’s strategy and mission, without the immediate interaction of 
group executives (Hansen et al., 2003; Hope et al., 2011). The primary aim of decentral-
ization is to enable business processes to integrate around delivering customer value 
(Chenhall, 2008). In other words, customers are thought to be best served and emerging 
opportunities observed if there are no hierarchical obstacles on the way. Hope and Fra-
ser (2003) also underline that it is the intrinsic motivation that really drives the perfor-
mance. 
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However, promoting empowerment without losing control is not an easy task to do and 
therefore great emphasis on considerations regarding different forms of control is need-
ed (Simons, 1995). Indeed, Berry et al. (2009) acknowledge that one of the biggest chal-
lenges for management control is to develop systems orchestrating both horizontal and 
vertical relationships. Argyris (1998) analyses the reasons behind the frequent failures 
in empowerment and makes a distinction between internal and external commitment, 
where the latter refers to employees trying to fulfill the contractual obligations that are 
given to them under the command-and-control type of management. Internal commit-
ment refers to employees being committed by their personal reasons, and hence is close 
to the concept of empowerment, which allows employees to have control over their own 
tasks and procedures to reach the targets. The author states that companies often strug-
gle with inconsistencies and contradictions related to mixing these two different types 
of commitments.   
The idea of moving away from traditional vertical structures and processes is also cap-
tured under the concept called ‘horizontal organization’. The concept is very similar to 
the principles of beyond budgeting, as horizontal organization is described to strive for 
continuous improvement and customer orientation through flattened structures and a 
team-based focus. In order to gain more comprehensive understanding of beyond budg-
eting in this context, the related literature will be connected to the discussion. What 
makes this interesting, is the fact that whereas beyond budgeting is strongly a manage-
ment accounting based concept, are the ideas of horizontal organizations mostly been 
developed among other disciplines, and not previously been connected to each other. 
(Chenhall, 2008)  
3.3.1. Decentralized organizational design 
Traditionally organizations have been arranged on a basis of strong vertical hierarchies 
where managers are enabled to control their organizations from the center (Hope and 
Fraser, 2003; Chenhall, 2008).  However, with the help of better information technology, 
companies have recently started to remove various levels of management leading to 
flattened organizations where the importance of lateral relations is increased (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008; Berry et al., 2009). Also the beyond budgeting phi-
losophy supports this movement by encouraging organizations to abandon the tradition-
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al command and control –type of management in order to make the employees at all 
organization levels to be more committed to the strategy (Hope et al., 2011). According 
to Hansen et al. (2003), this is especially important as the modern management innova-
tions that organizations are adopting are in strong contrast with the hierarchical nature 
of traditional budgetary control.  
According to the idea of beyond budgeting, the structural decentralization should result 
in arranging organizations around a network of cross-functional teams and processes to 
ensure adequate flexibility (Hope et al., 2011; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 
2008). As discussed earlier, these teams are empowered to develop the means for reach-
ing the targets within the given boundaries, which on the other hand can be a big chal-
lenge for most of the leaders (Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). Thereby instead of only 
being accountable for the results of the departments, managers are also made responsi-
ble for them (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). However, besides the flexibility, also 
firmness is needed and therefore the responsibilities need to be clearly defined (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008; Ostroff, 1999).  
3.3.2. Governance through open information 
As the radical decentralization of beyond budgeting is based on self-regulation and em-
powerment, a clear governance framework enabling the front-line employees to make 
the decisions is needed (Hope et al., 2011). But even though the advocates of beyond 
budgeting underline the importance of having a clear governance framework, the prin-
ciples give only little guidance to it as the only explicit recommendation is to promote 
shared values for the employees. Therefore other studies in the field of management 
accounting are now used to enrich the discussion.  
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008) study similar issues while they explore the 
nature of lateral relations and develop a framework for the package of governance prac-
tices for such relations both within and between organizations. The authors use the term 
‘lateral relation’ to refer to the arrangements where managers co-operate with their col-
leagues at similar hierarchical levels. They conclude that lateral relations require differ-
ent forms of governance than the control under hierarchical structures, and separate four 
structures of governance for both internal and inter-firm relationships. Whereas eco-
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nomic structure (1) refers to the economic contracts, such as performance measures and 
quality requirements agreed by the parties, focuses institutional structure (2) on ensur-
ing that the organization’s internal arrangements happen within the external boundaries 
set by the legal and other regulative requirements. Social structure (3) is about the be-
havioral norms such as communication and information sharing, and finally, technical 
structure (4) refers to the use of technical arrangements, such as available information 
systems and production techniques. The authors recognize that not all the lateral rela-
tions necessarily have the same elements but suggest the use of this framework to be 
used when examining them.  
As the issues related to economic structures have been discussed already in the previous 
chapters and as the institutional issues are beyond the scope of this study, the concentra-
tion is now on the social and technical structures of governance. More specifically, the 
topic of information sharing that is included in both structures is important, as the be-
yond budgeting principles suggest making information open and transparent (Hope et 
al., 2011). In fact, Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) remind that usually one of the ini-
tial reasons motivating companies to move beyond budgeting is to make the information 
more dynamic and visible, compared to using traditional budgets as a communication 
tool. However, when budgets are no longer used, companies need to specify what in-
formation flows are needed (Ferreira and Otley, 2009).   
Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) study how the demand and supply for managerial in-
formation is changed when the principles of beyond budgeting are being implemented 
in two companies. Firstly, they conclude that in order to support the idea of decentrali-
zation, information should be transparent and accessible to everyone in the organization. 
This is because when managers are expected to solve the problems at their own levels, 
they should have all the necessary information for effective decision making (Hope et 
al., 2011). The accessibility can be enhanced with investments on IT systems and large 
databases (Neely et al., 2003). Secondly, the authors find the frequency of information 
supply to increase due to the use of rolling forecasts. The information supply also be-
comes more accurate as the target setting is separated from planning in order to avoid 
dysfunctional game-playing, like discussed earlier in this study. Finally, the more accu-
rate forecasting and the decentralized planning provide opportunities for more frequent 
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lateral discussions between business controllers and managers, and thereby the amount 
of informal communication is also found to be increased.  
3.4. Cultural controls 
Organizational culture refers to the shared basic assumptions among the organizational 
members that represent a mutual knowledge of how to act, think and feel in different 
situations (Busco et al., 2006). It thus produces behavioral norms through the interaction 
of shared values, organizational structures and control systems (Henri, 2006). And even 
though there has been discussion going on whether culture is dominated by control or 
vice versa (Berry et al., 2009; Henri, 2006), there seems to be a strong support to the 
idea that people can be persuaded to adapt certain values, norms, and ideas of organiza-
tional life (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). In fact, as Collier (2005) concludes that in 
an entrepreneurial organization group norms and culture can be even more important 
than formal controls, it indicates social controls to play a major role in the context of 
beyond budgeting. Additionally, studies related to the implementation of balanced 
scorecards show that cultural issues sometimes work as constraints to the effective use 
of the technique (Richards, 2006). Hence, rather than just a change in the accounting 
techniques, the journey towards beyond budgeting is a matter of change in the mindsets 
of the employees (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). 
Malmi and Brown (2008) include three cultural controls into their typology: (1) values, 
(2) symbols, and (3) clans. Value controls refer to the formal organizational definitions, 
such as mission statements, that provide basic values and give direction for the organi-
zation (Simons, 1994). Symbols are visible expressions, such as dress codes, that are 
used to develop a certain culture, and finally, clan controls refer to the distinct subcul-
tures emerged from the socialization process within the firm, that may relate for exam-
ple to different professions (Ouchi, 1979).  
3.4.1. High responsibility culture 
The introduction of beyond budgeting is a large cultural change as all the employees 
need to get used to the relative performance measures and decentralized structures 
(Hope et al., 2011; Chenhall, 2008). This explicitly implies that the implementation is 
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not just a matter of finance department, but also efforts of human resources department 
are needed to create appropriate culture (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). According to 
the principles, people should be bonded to a common cause and a high responsibility 
culture should be created in order to give boundaries for the empowered teams to oper-
ate within (Hope et al., 2011). The actual means for building such culture is again prac-
tically missing from the related literature, but presumably would be highly company-
specific anyway. Nevertheless, managers should be aware of the values within an organ-
ization before trying to adapt new organizational processes into use (Henri, 2006).  
3.4.2. Psychological climate accommodating trust 
The critics of traditional budgeting argue that budgets are based on central control and 
thereby assume the absence of trust. On the contrary, the relative improvement contract 
of beyond budgeting is underlined to be based on self-regulation which assumes that the 
teams can be trusted to manage their own affairs within the agreed boundaries, and to be 
fully accountable for their results. (Hope et al., 2011) Trust thereby is seen essential 
when promoting beyond budgeting into an organization, and such structures that miti-
gate the risks of different units with different motives working together should be used 
(Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008). As the level of trust is more personal than 
organizational matter, individual psychological climate should be separated from the 
organizational culture as suggested by Chenhall (2008). According to the author, psy-
chological climate refers to the perceptions of the employees about the internal envi-
ronment in the organization.   
On the other hand, as the implementation of beyond budgeting is an individual mental 
state and behavior change that includes many reforms to the way of thinking, it can be 
perceived differently by different employees. Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe (2013) describe 
the process as moving managers outside their “comfort” zones towards a “stretch” zone, 
where new ways of thinking must be seized on. The change is easier for those managers 
who have already found traditional budgets to be discommodious and thus are open to 
change, than for those who have not felt traditional budgets to be restrictive. The au-
thors therefore underline the importance of acknowledging the differing individual men-
tal states in order to avoid moving to a “panic” zone where high level of anxiety and 
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lower level of performance exists. Thus, a proper level of certainties and uncertainties 
are needed. 
3.5. Complete framework  
Figure 3 summarizes the whole previous discussion by illustrating the key ideal features 
of the entirety of management control systems in the setting of beyond budgeting. It 
contains the normative prescriptions of the literature for the control package design, 
arranged around three sets of control.  Following the study of Ferreira and Otley (2009), 
the whole package of controls is surrounded by operational environment, which is one 
important contingency factor outside the direct control of management (Hansen et al., 
2003). 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Ideal features of beyond budgeting
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the absolute figures of traditional budgets would need to be reset. On the other hand, 
managers can also be compensated during the bad times in the economy, if they just 
manage to perform better compared to their internal or external peers. Keeping this in 
mind, it is surprising to find that the literature related to contingency factors in the de-
sign of management control systems is not previously referenced in the discussion of 
beyond budgeting (Hansen et al., 2003). 
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Figure 4 gives an overview of the ideal planning process used in Statoil. 
 
Figure 4: Ambition to action
 
31 
T STATOIL 
oil and energy company that is being
, and more importantly, it is 
the literature (e.g. Bourmistrov and 
nes, 2009
parisons to the case 
to build a basis for the upcoming discussion related to the 
 
ting (Bogsnes, 2009), and therefore the 
s the practices of an ideal unit in the company. 
 at Statoil (Bogsnes, 2009) 
 publicly 
the most often 
). This 
the units are 
Anyway, 
 
 
  
 
32 
 
4.1. Ambition to action 
The planning processes at Statoil are structured around ‘Ambition to action’, which is 
the company’s own version of balanced scorecard, and is described to have four features 
that make it unique compared to other typical scorecards. Firstly, it is a stand-alone sys-
tem and hence is not only supplementing traditional budgets. Secondly, it is perceived 
to successfully balance the trade-off between central alignment and local ownership, 
and thirdly, to take the strategic objectives of the company alongside to the traditional 
KPIs. Finally, it is considered to accommodate the integration of the company’s pro-
cesses particularly well. (Bogsnes, 2009) In order to simplify the discussion and in-
crease the direct comparability, the ‘Ambition to action’ is from now on referred only as 
a ‘scorecard’ in this study.  
All the planning processes at Statoil begin after the company’s strategy is being formu-
lated in the spring. The group-level strategy process is continuous, meaning that it can 
be reviewed always when needed, or in either of the regular semiannual executive 
committee sessions. Thus, the strategy of the company is not perceived to be fixed. The 
developed strategic objectives have a medium-term perspective, where the precise 
length of the term varies depending on the rhythm of the particular business unit. Never-
theless, the term is not fixed to the fiscal year and can therefore be for example 18 
months long (Banham, 2012). The objectives are described to remain stable unless there 
are any major changes occurring in the chosen strategic direction. (Bogsnes, 2009) 
After the strategy formulation is finished, the scorecards are used to translate the strate-
gy into more concrete KPI targets that reflect the ambitions of the top management 
(Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). Thus, the starting point in the target setting is not at 
the sub-departmental level as it has previously been, but on the assessment of what is 
needed to meet the strategic ambition of the management. The top management team 
sets the delivery goals for the unit managers, and respectively the superior of a particu-
lar business unit has the authority for target approval of his subordinates. Targets in the 
group-level scorecard are approved by the board. (Bogsnes, 2009) 
After the target setting process has been finalized, the company moves into the planning 
phase during the autumn. The planning is described to be only about (1) developing 
actions that are needed to meet the strategic objectives and (2) forecasting the expected 
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consequences. However, unlike recommended in the beyond budgeting literature, 
Statoil uses quarterly updated fixed short-term forecasts in its planning phase, as the 
company considers them to be more suitable for the oil industry. Further justification 
for this decision is not reported in the literature, but the forecasting horizon again is told 
to vary depending on the business in question (The Statoil Book, 2013). Nevertheless, 
after the plans have been developed, a target review takes place in order to avoid un-
comfortable situations where the original targets are not realistically achievable for the 
particular subject. (Bogsnes, 2009) 
The business follow-up is done every month, as review meetings are arranged to com-
pare the realistic forecasts to the pre-defined targets (The Statoil Book, 2013). Important 
thus is to understand that the comparison is not done between actual figures and budget-
ed targets, as the aim of the follow-up is to look forward (Bogsnes, 2009).    
4.2. Resource allocation 
The authority for resource allocation decisions at Statoil is decentralized for the units to 
happen within the boundaries set by the targets. In other words, the top management 
guides the resource allocation decisions indirectly by altering the targets and profitabil-
ity criteria, instead of interfering in the affairs of the units. Additionally, to ensure suffi-
cient control over the investments, the decentralized action is supplemented with a 
common set of decision criteria for projects, and with explicit decision authorities that 
state the size of a decision a manager is allowed to make before having to go up in the 
organizational hierarchy. (Bogsnes, 2009) 
Statoil also has several central committees reviewing the largest projects from different 
organizational angles and giving independent recommendations whether they should be 
initiated or not. These ‘arenas’ pressure test the technology development-, investment-,  
and IT projects at defined maturity stages to ensure the quality and consistency across 
the organization. The committees do not have decision power as such, but the units are 
described to usually follow their recommendations. Anyway, all investments should be 
reviewed in such arenas and the received recommendation should be included in the 
final decision document. If extra financing is needed, the units can acquire it around the 
year, but good argumentation is needed to receive the approval (Bogsnes, 2009; The 
Statoil Book, 2013) 
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4.3. People@Statoil 
The employee performance evaluation process at Statoil is referred as ‘People@Statoil’ 
and is also done with the help of the company scorecards. The individual bonus pay-
ments are based on holistic assessments as besides reviewing the KPIs, also subjective 
considerations are taken into account: the performance is assessed against the ambi-
tiousness of the targets and the sustainability of the delivered results. The performance 
evaluation is thus considered to address both delivery and behavior. Statoil has also at 
place a collective bonus system that is based on the company’s overall performance, 
where the amount of payment is tied to the company’s share price. More specifically, 
the employees can use 5% of their base salary to buy the company shares and receive 
one free share for each one that is bought. The shares are not allowed to be sold until 
two years have passed. (Bogsnes, 2009; The Statoil Book, 2013) 
All the scorecards are described to have 10-15 key performance indicators that are to be 
reviewed twice in a year. The company aims to use relative measures and benchmarks 
as much as possible, but acknowledge the difficultness of finding appropriate data for 
such use in practice. At group-level, benchmark data is easier to find and company’s 
relative return on capital employed (ROCE) and relative shareholder return are com-
pared to a league of 14 reasonably similar companies. In the absence of reliable bench-
mark data, the units are usually benchmarked against their own past performance and 
the connection between input and output is being measured (Østergren and Stensaker, 
2011). Finally, Statoil has introduced internal league standings for the health, safety, 
and environmental issues. Thus, all the units are put on a table where they can see 
whether they perform better or worse than their peers. This arrangement is considered to 
remove the need for re-negotiating the targets every year, and make the units more like-
ly to accept the targets without protests. On the other hand, it is thought that a low per-
forming unit might become interested in learning from those above it. (Bogsnes, 2009)  
4.4. Open information and ‘The Statoil Book’ 
Like discussed earlier, the top management at Statoil does not aim to micromanage the 
business units and thereby the decision power is decentralized. This arrangement is fur-
ther supported with the use of relative indicators that enable units to operate more inde-
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pendently if they manage to perform well: higher output allows also higher spending on 
input. Also the relatively flat organizational structure seems to follow the idea of decen-
tralization: Statoil is a matrix organization and is arranged around 6 hierarchical levels, 
horizontally formed by different process owners (The Statoil Book, 2013).     
Besides using the scorecards and target setting, the empowerment is also governed with 
open information and common values. Indeed, the company has made major invest-
ments to improve its IT systems, and even introduced a separate project for the devel-
opment. Nowadays the company’s information system (MIS) plays a crucial role mak-
ing the information as transparent as possible. The open information is considered to 
create peer pressure for the business units (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013) and it is 
also used to help the front-line teams to perform their daily operations. On the other 
hand, the common values are formally promoted with the help of ‘The Statoil Book’, 
which is a booklet that is given to each employee in the company. It describes how 
things should be done in the company and provides some guidance by discussing the 
company values and leadership principles, operating model, and corporate policies. 
Thus, the booklet sets the standards for behavior and shows what is expected. Finally, 
the employees are trusted to have common sense and therefore sound business judgment 
is also considered to be an explicit boundary for behavior. (Bogsnes, 2009; Østergren 
and Stensaker, 2011; The Statoil Book, 2013) 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the methodological foundations for this study are being presented. First, 
the chosen research method is presented and justified as the main features of the method 
will be discussed and the related problems addressed. Secondly, the reasoning for the 
decisions regarding case company selection and data collection is presented.  
5.1. Research method 
The research method of this study can be viewed either as an explanatory or descriptive 
multiple case-study: existing management control practices of specific case companies 
are being examined, and the reasons behind those particular practices are being ana-
lyzed (Scapens, 1990; Parker, 2012). The aim of the empirical part is to describe how 
the case companies have complemented their budgeting, and then use the derived 
framework to compare the arrangements to the ideal features of beyond budgeting, and 
to the practices of Statoil. As the literature review in this study also refined the sparse 
and ambiguous concept of beyond budgeting by distinguishing the main elements from 
the related literature, it can also be considered as a sort of theory refinement study, 
where greater precision to the construct is being sought (Keating, 1995). That said, it is 
important to underline that the concept of beyond budgeting is not a real theory, but 
instead a concept created by practitioners. Nevertheless, as Vaivio (2008) argues, also 
such consultancy views must be scrutinized and refined as they have often become pop-
ular in practice, and are therefore too important to be left outside the interest of re-
searchers.  
The popularity of qualitative case studies in the field of management accounting re-
search has increased during the past decades (Scapens, 1990). They provide an alterna-
tive to the more traditional positivist quantitative research agenda by recognizing that 
accounting is a construct of organizational reality, and that the insights to the subject 
can also emerge from the process of qualitative data analysis (Parker, 2012). In other 
words, qualitative case studies are able to explain the decisions behind particular ac-
counting practices, whereas positive theories influenced by neoclassical economics are 
more useful when predicting the outcomes and making generalizations of trends 
(Scapens, 1990). Moreover, Vaivio (2008) argues that qualitative research enables to go 
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beyond the functionalist view of management accounting phenomenon where the reality 
is assumed to be overly practical and perfect. In practice, the decision processes are sel-
dom that rational and linear.  
The qualitative case approach also allows researcher to change the direction of the study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) if necessary, which can be considered to be an asset as the bounda-
ries of beyond budgeting have previously been defined only vaguely like discussed ear-
lier in this study. Indeed, as Parker (2012) and Vaivio (2008) argue, the qualitative case 
approach is especially suitable when the previous literature provide only fragmented 
frame of the topic in question; the ideas for reconstruction and criticism of such con-
cepts are best found if the study is able to provide sufficiently thorough understanding 
of the practices in use (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006). In the context of beyond 
budgeting, this means that it is not enough to describe whether an organization has some 
specific tool in use or not; more important is to understand why the decision has been 
made, and what are the consequences that have followed.  
There is also a general call for such studies in this field of management accounting to 
gain deeper understanding of the related issues (e.g. Libby and Lindsay, 2010; Berry et 
al., 2009; Østergren and Stensaker 2011) and to critically examine such normative pre-
scriptions of process improvements that originally have been created by practitioners 
(e.g. Vaivio, 2008). It has also been argued that questionnaires and statistical analyses 
can give only a superficial view of the practices in use (Scapens, 1990). Indeed, given 
the dynamic nature of control systems design (Berry et al., 2009) and the complexity of 
the issues related to the entirety of management control systems (Malmi and Brown, 
2008), in-depth qualitative case studies are needed to understand all the related inter-
links.  
5.2. Issues related to generalization, depth, and rigor 
Important is to understand that the purpose of qualitative case studies differ from the 
positivist research tradition. A case study is not a statistical study with a small number 
of samples, and the aim of such study is not to make any universally generalizable find-
ings that could be applied to a broader population (Vaivio, 2008; Parker, 2003). Instead, 
they examine specific organizational activities and changes (Van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselmann, 2006) and give building blocks for future studies to lean on when testing 
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the validity across larger population (Vaivio, 2008). Similarly also Lukka and Kasanen 
(1995) argue that while not being capable of doing statistical generalizations, qualitative 
research can still expose the strengths and weaknesses of a concept in question, as it is 
being put into contact with empirical reality.  
Thus, the aim of this study is not to generalize the results in a statistical sense, but to 
clarify the discussion around beyond budgeting and perhaps provide basis and typology 
for future studies to be tested with larger population. The sights are set on examining 
the control processes interacting with the specific organizational activities and changes 
like suggested by Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006). It can also be argued 
that making statistical generalizations of this topic would be difficult even if there 
would be an existing framework for executing such study, as the company practices can 
only be conceptualized at a certain point of time and new organizational or environmen-
tal changes can occur rather quickly (Chenhall, 2008).   
One main dilemma regarding the qualitative research design is the question of depth 
versus breadth (Vaivio, 2008). In other words, should the research focus solely on a one 
single organization or should it aim to address a phenomenon that exists across multiple 
companies? As performing a holistic study of the whole organizational system is con-
sidered to be rather unattainable (Scapens, 1990), the depth of this study is slightly re-
duced and the breadth increased to involve two case companies. The decision to per-
form a multiple case study was done also in order to gain richer empirical evidence as 
focusing on only one organization would not provide possibilities for comparative 
search of similarities and differences in the patterns of behavior (Vaivio, 2008), and 
would thus supposedly restrict the ability to draw conclusions. On the other hand, the 
reason for not including any more companies to the analysis relates to the fact that the 
workload would quickly increase beyond the reasonable level without essentially im-
proving the ability for making generalizations of the observations. In other words, it is 
believed that two case companies can provide at least some evidence, and the possible 
statistical studies with larger populations should be done by future researchers on the 
basis of this study.  
On the other hand, Parker (2012) reminds that qualitative tradition embraces research-
er’s closer relationship with the case company and thereby the issues of reflexivity and 
rigor are needed to be taken into consideration. Hence, it is important to mention that no 
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prior connections between the case companies and the researcher exist, enabling the 
observations to be better done as an ‘outsider’. Likewise, as will be described next, the 
decision to interview organizations outside the orbit of beyond budgeting advocates 
allows this study to enhance its objectivity as the case companies do not have any com-
mercial interests at play like suggested by Vaivio (2008).    
5.3. Description of the case companies and data collection 
The empirical part of this study was done as a multiple case study, which examined how 
two Finnish publicly listed multinational corporations outside the orbit of beyond budg-
eting use other management control systems to complement budgeting. To protect the 
anonymity of the case companies, they are being referred as ‘Company X’ and ‘Compa-
ny Y’, and no exact background data of them is provided. Nevertheless, the reasoning 
for the company selection is now given.  
First of all, it was considered to be important that neither of the case companies is 
among the members of Beyond Budgeting Round Table, as it was concluded in the lit-
erature review that Hope and Fraser (2003) compressed the original twelve principles 
from the best practices of real-world companies explicitly operating without budgets, 
and that the idea of BBRT is to transfer the knowledge from practitioners to academia. 
In other words, it was assumed that companies that have moved beyond budgeting fol-
low the ideas rather closely, as the principles are at least partially based on the compa-
nies themselves. Thus, in order to enrich the discussion and avoid making circular ar-
guments and paradoxical conclusions, the chosen approach, that is alternative to the 
general tradition of beyond budgeting research where the practices of explicit adopters 
are being analyzed (e.g. Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Østergren and Stensaker 2011; 
Bogsnes, 2009), was chosen. On the other hand, as beyond budgeting can be considered 
to be a consultancy view that is originally created by practitioners, the existence of 
commercial interests should be acknowledged (Vaivio, 2008). Indeed, contacting per-
sons who have own interests at play may easily expose the objectivity of the study, as 
the interviewees that most freely speak out are often agents that promote the new prac-
tice (Vaivio, 2008). Therefore the decision to examine organizations outside the orbit of 
BBRT also mitigates the problem of exposing the objectivity of the study.   
  
 
40 
 
Secondly, in order to attain the comparability to Statoil, which is a large Nordic organi-
zation, listed in the stocks of New York and Oslo, the company selection was influ-
enced by the issues related to size, publicity, and origins. Therefore the both chosen 
case companies are Finnish multinational corporations listed in the NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki. More precisely, Company X is a large-cap firm, and Company Y is a small-
cap company. The issue related to the size of the company was also considered to be 
important as it was assumed that if the companies are large enough, they presumably 
have systematic and well-developed control processes in place. Thus, neither of the 
companies can be managed with only pure business instinct of the central management. 
Thirdly, as it was shown earlier, the literature criticizing the idea of beyond budgeting 
claims that the principles are suitable only for companies with unlimited resources 
(Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012) operating in stabile industries (Libby and Lindsay, 
2010). Moreover, it has been stated that beyond budgeting is especially unsuitable for 
manufacturing companies as their operations need to be planned in advance. In order to 
take this criticism into account and challenge the ideas of beyond budgeting even fur-
ther, it was considered to be necessary to find such companies that do not meet the pro-
posed ideal characters of beyond budgeting. Hence, both chosen case companies operate 
within a highly volatile technology industry, and as they have recently gone through 
large reconstructions and been forced to strongly cut costs, it can be assumed that the 
both of them have tight control processes at place, and no excess money available. 
Moreover, Company X is partially a manufacturing company.  
Due to the complexity and context-specificity of the topic and the non-existent previous 
knowledge of the specific organizational practices, the data collection of the case com-
panies was carried out through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Such face-to-face 
meetings can be described as a certain form of interactive conversations, where the pre-
determined structure of the interviewer is combined with greater flexibility (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003). In other words, some pre-formulated questions are being used without 
strict adherence to them, allowing new questions to emerge during the conversation 
(Myers, 2009).  
The persons that were chosen to be interviewed represent the authors responsible for the 
budgeting- and financial planning processes in the companies, and thereby were consid-
ered to have the most comprehensive understanding of the practices in use. More specif-
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ically, the person that was interviewed at Company X, works as a director of business 
planning and analysis (from now on referred as ‘Director’), and is part of the team oper-
ating right under the corporate CFO. The team is responsible for management reporting, 
the development of business planning processes, financials of the strategic initiatives, 
and also produces market forecasts. On the other hand, two business controllers (from 
now on referred as ‘Controller 1’ and ‘Controller 2’) were being interviewed separately 
at Company Y. Besides working with the concern’s internal calculations such as fore-
casting, budgeting and project calculations, the two business controllers also produce 
the company interims and participate in the compilation of financial statements. They 
also share the seats in the management teams in each of the company’s business units. 
Each of the semi-structured one-hour interviews took place at the corporate headquar-
ters of both companies during the September 2013. The interviews were recorded.   
On the other hand, the decision for not interviewing the representatives of Statoil was 
made as there are multiple existing case descriptions regarding the company practices 
already available (e.g. Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Østergren and Stensaker, 2011). 
Moreover, the company itself tries to follow the original idea of BBRT, and thus rather 
openly share the information related to its journey towards beyond budgeting (e.g. The 
Statoil Book, 2013; Bogsnes, 2009). It was also concluded that no prior studies have 
summarized the information available from these sources.  
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6. CASE DESCRIPTIO
 
The empirical part of this study focuses on analyzing how the case companies comple-
ment their budgeting practices with other management control systems. In other words, 
this chapter aims to describe the arrangements that the companies have independently 
made to mitigate the budget-related problems proposed in the literature. The chapter 
ends with a discussion related to the discomfort of balancing between accuracy and 
workload, addressed by both case companies.  
6.1. General description of the planning processes 
Before being able to discuss the ways that the case companies have mitigated the budg-
et-related problems, an overview of the processes at place must be provided. Therefore 
a general description of the existing practices in both case companies is now given.  
6.1.1. Business planning processes at Company X 
The basic planning processes at Company X are divided into three time perspectives: 
long-range, annual and short-term.  
Long-range planning 
The long-range plan at Company X is strategically focused and it covers three of the 
following calendar years, where the current year is taken out from the annual forecast at 
place. The plan is usually formulated during the spring and it is described to follow a 
centralistic approach. In other words, despite the conversations with the different busi-
ness units, the long-range plan is a top-down exercise where the goal is to put strategy 
into numbers. The plan includes a lot of different scenarios and is completely an excel-
based iterative process.  
Previously the long-range plan at Company X was done every year simultaneously with 
the company’s annual strategic updates, but this practice has since changed as the com-
pany is currently updating its corporate strategy only when found to be necessary. In 
other words, instead of annually imposing a new strategy, the aim is to update the cur-
rent one only when considered to be required, and edit only those parts of the strategy 
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that are being changed. However, as the financial figures are considered to be impossi-
ble to be updated only partially, the company has found it necessary to continue the an-
nual practice of compiling the general financial view of the situation. Hence, the team 
responsible for long-term planning participates in the strategy projects and annually 
alters the underlying forecasts based on them.  
Annual planning 
In 2011, the company began to use the current practice of annual planning where the 
aim is to produce a holistic plan by supporting the financial figures with workforce 
planning, opportunity and risk analyses, and also with strategic prioritizations and quali-
tative targets. After being approved, the annual budget offers the operative milestones 
that should be achieved in order to be able to follow the organization’s strategic initia-
tives.  
The formulation process begins during the fall when the team responsible for the busi-
ness analysis creates a CEO planning memo to be approved by both CFO and CEO. The 
memo sets the corporate-level assumptions and target requirements to be delivered 
down to the organization. After that, a two-month planning process begins where all the 
business units formulate their own detailed business plans. During that process, the 
business units validate the top-line guidance and are allowed to make requirements to 
change them. In other words, the top-line guidance represents the best possible outcome 
which can then be stretched to a way or another. The negotiations in general are divided 
into two distinct processes: one process for the fixed costs and one process for the sales 
and margins. The latter culminates in the late fall when an event called ‘business inter-
lock’ is arranged, where the representatives of the business units and different regions 
negotiate and agree on the sales- and gross margin targets per region. The former pro-
cess of approving fixed costs is simpler and occurs during the two-month planning peri-
od. After the negotiations have been finished, the annual plan sets the targets for sales 
and expenditures for which both are monitored against on a monthly basis. Additionally, 
it sets the fixed cost budget and expresses the qualitative targets.  
Previously the whole target setting process began by examining an official corporate-
level market forecast and then deriving the achievable market share from the forecast to 
be the new target. In other words, instead of forecasting sales to be a specific monetary 
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figure, the amount of sales was estimated through the approximation of the market share 
percentage. The role of market shares has since reduced a bit as it is not seen to be the 
most restricting factor in the business anymore, but it is still considered to be important.  
Rolling forecasts 
Short-term planning at Company X is done with the help of rolling forecasts, which 
have a perspective of current plus four of the following quarters. The forecast is updated 
every month to reflect the best knowledge of the most probable outcome. Therefore the 
formulation process follows a bottom-up approach, where everything begins when the 
salesmen first create their own individual forecasts.  
The rolling forecast itself is formulated at a very detailed level and is done for each pe-
riod, comprising figures related to regions, individual customers, and product variants. 
The reason for the high level of details is that the rolling forecast is directly linked to the 
logistics system of the organization. In other words, the logistics plan defining the 
amounts of different product variants to be delivered to specific customers is formulated 
directly based on the forecast, with only minor adjustments done if perceived to be nec-
essary. In practice, the responsible team defines only the minimum level for the required 
amount of details, and the business units are allowed to forecast even in more detail if 
they consider it to be necessary. The forecast is then compared to the annual plan, and 
the requirement to take any actions is considered. The interviewed Director illustrates 
this forward-looking perspective by underlining that the explanation for variance must 
be made immediately when the forecast starts to differ from the budget 
”If the actual costs unexpectedly overrun the forecast and annual budget, there will be ruc-
tions. Because that would mean that you don’t have the situation under control and that 
your forecasts cannot be trusted.”  
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6.1.2. Business planning processes at Company Y 
Business planning at Company Y is arranged around two separate processes: annual 
budgeting and rolling forecasts. 
Annual budgeting process 
The budgeting process at Company Y starts during the October and typically lasts two 
months, unless there are any organizational changes planned to be implemented during 
the upcoming year. The whole process begins when the top management and the board 
of directors set the organizational growth and profit targets for the following year. Dur-
ing the same time the prospects of the business units are being analyzed with the help of 
company’s sales organization, as it is evaluated which of the units have growth potential 
and which are closer to a zero growth. Decreasing budgets are not typically even ac-
cepted. Based on the growth prospects, the targets are then delivered to each business 
unit. The business unit managers then follow the similar procedure and deliver the re-
ceived targets to the managers of their sub-units, who then start to formulate the budgets 
on the templates made by the business controllers. The sum of the sub-units’ budgets 
become the budget of a business unit, and similarly when all the business unit-level 
numbers are summed together, it becomes the company-level budget. Thus, as the busi-
ness units are responsible for the compilation of budgets, the role of finance department 
is only to coordinate and support the process. The budgets of the group’s support func-
tions are also formulated and allocated to the sub-unit level.  
However, usually there is some resistance in the business units to accept the stretch tar-
gets set by the top management team and therefore the budget negotiation process in-
cludes multiple rounds when the business units, controllers and top management try to 
find the appropriate level of requirements to be delivered for each unit. Nevertheless, 
the final deadline for the budgets to be finalized is in December, when the board of di-
rectors convenes to accept the proposed targets.  
Rolling forecast process 
Company Y uses rolling forecasts in its operational planning, which are updated every 
week and have a scope of two quartiles. The forecasting process follows a bottom-up 
approach where the project managers are first required to forecast their future turnovers, 
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and then the managers of the sub-units compile the project data, making necessary ad-
justments if consider it to be necessary. This arrangement is done in order to ensure that 
the forecasts reflect the most realistic view of the future. However, even though all units 
formulate the forecasts on the same templates created by the business controllers, the 
way that the information is compiled varies depending on the practices of the unit man-
agers. Nevertheless, the amount of details in the rolling forecast is identical to annual 
budgets as they both use the same template, with the exception that unlike the annual 
budgets, rolling forecasts are done at project-level.  
The management teams of the business units meet every week to monitor the progress 
of forecasts in relation to the targets set in advance by the budgets. The biggest vari-
ances are identified and the reasons behind them examined. Depending on the situation, 
business units are then either required to cut costs, or the budget variance is accepted as 
a result of an unforeseen external factor beyond the control of the business units. In oth-
er words, the rolling forecast is used to control if there is a need to either cut costs or to 
take actions improving the turnover in order to meet the predetermined targets. Similar-
ly the board of directors convenes to make comparisons between forecasts and budgets 
every month. 
6.2. Arrangements mitigating the problems of budgeting 
Like mentioned in chapter 2, the budget-related problems have been acknowledged for 
years, and most of the companies are constantly improving their processes to mitigate 
the problems. Next, the arrangements that the case companies have made to their prac-
tices are being described.  
6.2.1. Biased target setting and the inaccuracy of the forecasts 
Budgets have been criticized for encouraging employees to negotiate lowest possible 
targets for themselves and to simultaneously endanger the accuracy of the forecasts as 
they are being biased by the related target setting. In order to mitigate this problem, both 
case companies have made organizational arrangements as the separate processes of 
annual planning and rolling forecasting in both organizations function differently and 
are used for different purposes. Thus, both case companies seem to use the annual 
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budgets mainly for target setting, as they are being formulated following a top-down 
approach, where the top management sets the targets for the units and regions to be 
reached in the next period. On the other hand, rolling forecasts are formulated bottom-
up, and used for both operational planning and to give truthful signals to the manage-
ment whether the company is on the right track. Also the end-users of the forecasts and 
budgets differ as the comment of Controller 2 at Company Y reveals:  
“The board of directors is more interested to follow the budgets, while we inside the com-
pany manage the business and are more interested in the information of the forecasts.”  
This arrangement of separating the processes enhances the reliability of the forecasts as 
the accuracy is no longer distorted by the simultaneous target setting and wishful think-
ing. On the other hand, as the target setting is done following a top-down approach, the 
main decision power is centralized and the problem of negotiating too low targets can 
be mitigated at least to some extent through the top management putting more target 
pressure on the units. However, it is worth mentioning that the truth is not quite this 
straightforward as in both companies the business units are also allowed to participate in 
the target setting process. This decision is done in order to make the employees more 
committed to the common organizational goals. Anyway, the top management always 
has the final decision power over the targets as the Director at Company X concludes: 
“Everyone is allowed to say their opinions, but the targets that are set by the top-line man-
agers are not altered easily … unless you have some good argumentation behind the re-
quest.”  
This practice of separating target setting from planning has not always been at place. 
Indeed, previously Company X had a half-year planning cycle where the current 
month’s version of the short-term rolling forecast was simply adjusted to meet the cor-
porate goals and then ‘frozen’ to be the new biannual target. In other words, the plans 
and targets were the same numbers as suggested in the traditional budgeting literature. 
However, according to the Director, this led to having problems with supply planning as 
the target setting was linked to the production management:  
“The demand for a specific product was kept high with a pure will when it should have 
been evident that the forecasted market demand is not going to be realized. This led to hav-
ing problems with overproduction.”  
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Finally, while the separation of these two elements increases the accuracy of the fore-
casts, the problem of game playing the targets as low as possible is not mitigated that 
easily. Indeed, both Business Controllers at Company Y admit that there is still a certain 
incentive for such behavior. Similarly also the Director at Company X considers this to 
be a sort of ‘built-in’ problem of budgeting and acknowledges such game playing to be 
rather inevitable in target setting. 
6.2.2. Lack of flexibility and the excessive use of the pre-allocated resources 
The literature criticizing the use of annual budgeting also accuses budgets for rejecting 
important projects due to the budget constraints, and on the other hand, for provoking 
business units to spend the whole budget in order to avoid losing the resources in the 
next period. However, when unanticipated opportunities arise during the year, the budg-
ets of the case companies seem to be much more flexible than proposed by the critics. 
Indeed, in both companies it is possible to apply extra financing from the top manage-
ment team or board of directors, depending on the size of the project. The Director at 
Company X admits that in practice the starting point is that every unit should prioritize 
their own projects and spending to find the required financing for the new projects. Sim-
ilarly also Controller 1 at Company Y describes that extra financing is usually given 
only to projects that are justified with argumentation that is based on pure financial ben-
efits:  
“Making the employees more satisfied in general is not a valid argument when applying ex-
tra financing.”   
On the other hand, the proposed problem of resources being used only to avoid losing 
them in the next period seems to be exaggerated as neither of the case companies con-
siders it to be a problem, even though acknowledging the existence of some incentives 
for such behavior. Indeed, Controller 2 at Company Y mention that the issue of spend-
ing all the money usually regards only the resources given for employee refreshment or 
education, which both are considered to be small sums in the overall picture of the busi-
ness. Additionally, if a business unit realizes to have problems meeting the budgeted 
targets, it has an intrinsic incentive to cut all the extra costs and thereby restrict the 
amount of resources used for the employees. In other words, the units are considered to 
self-regulate their spending rather effectively. Controller 1 also underlines that the allo-
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cation of resources is always dependent on the business aspects of the company in a 
way that if, for example, some specific investment is dot done during the year, the top 
management considers its necessity again during the next budget negotiations. 
Interestingly, the Director at Company X reveals that bigger problem regarding the us-
age of resources is actually quite the opposite than proposed in the literature: the man-
agement is more often surprised with the behavior where units are not spending all the 
budgeted resources. He considers this phenomenon to be a ‘built-in under-utilization 
parameter’ of budgeting, which results from two reasons. Firstly, the units and teams 
usually aim to use little bit less resources than budgeted, as they are aware that they will 
probably get recognized if they somewhat manage to meet the qualitative targets with 
fewer resources than originally budgeted. And vice versa, if they use more resources 
than budgeted, they know that they will be criticized. Secondly, as the business plans 
are often done based on the best possible scenarios, even a small delay somewhere in 
the business process can lead the actual costs to be lower than budgeted. If for example 
there is a delay in the production, also advertising campaigns must be delayed and the 
reserved resources will be left unused during that period. The problem is that when all 
the available resources are not invested in developing the business, the resources are 
used ineffectively. This problem is mitigated at least to some extent by simply taking 
more risks in the budgeting process as described by the Director at Company X:  
“Especially in such organizations where this problem is large, regions are given, for ex-
ample, more money for marketing than there actually is capacity in the total budget, be-
cause something is always left unused.” 
Additionally, to ensure that financing is given to the overall best projects in the organi-
zation, Company X has introduced a process called ‘business improvement interlock’. It 
aims to coordinate and prioritize development projects in IT and other processes over 
the boundaries of organization’s internal units. Thereby the problem of resources being 
allocated ineffectively is further mitigated.  
6.2.3. Overemphasis of the financial considerations 
Budgets have also been criticized for making the employees willing to focus only on 
achieving the financial targets, instead of taking customer satisfaction or other valuable 
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non-financial aspects into account. In order to mitigate this problem, both case compa-
nies have designed their rewarding practices to accommodate also non-financial consid-
erations as will be described next. 
The individual bonus payments in Company X in general are partially based on the 
achievement of annual budgets and partially on the achievement of individual- or team-
level targets, depending on the role and the organizational level that a person works at. 
At the lower levels of the organization, the payments are tied to the individual or group-
level targets and scorecards. On the other hand, the higher the organizational level, the 
more the payments are tied to the organizational targets. Nevertheless, scorecards are 
being used to find appropriate strategic measures for the evaluation.  
Similarly also Company Y has a bonus payment system tailored for the managers, 
salesmen, and some of the project owners. The performance evaluation is done with the 
help of scorecards and the budgeted numbers are used as a basis for finding appropriate 
target levels for the indicators. In fact, the company is currently introducing more sys-
tematic ways to use the scorecards for performance evaluation around the organization. 
Controller 1 underlines the importance of understanding that the absolute financial 
numbers reveal only one part of the truth, and in order to be able to anticipate the future 
challenges more comprehensively, also the qualitative indicators need to be closely 
monitored:  
“Company’s turnover might seem to be at a decent level, but when the indicators, such as 
customer satisfaction, start to give early warnings, also the turnover and profitability will 
plunge at a certain point.” 
Both companies also use non-financial rewarding practices to encourage the employees 
to widen their perspectives. For example, the employees and teams at Company Y are 
given public recognition as some of them are being rewarded for good work in the com-
pany’s staff-info every quartile. The awards are given based on either customer satisfac-
tion surveys or peer recognition, and the reasoning is told publicly to the audience. Sim-
ilarly also Company X has a system accommodating peer recognition, as the employees 
can indicate official compliments to their colleagues and after receiving five of these 
courtesies, the employee receives a small bonus. Also verbal gratitude from the top-line 
managers to the employees is given.  
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6.2.4. Budgets restricting the drive for constant improvement 
It is argued in the literature that the absolute numbers used in the budgets restrict the 
organization’s drive for constant improvement as the employees do not have any inter-
ests to exceed the given targets. In order to take this problem into account, both case 
companies have again taken similar steps to mitigation. 
First of all, both companies have built their compensation systems in a way that the in-
centives are not capped by the budget. Indeed, in Company X, there has been a practice 
of rewarding the salesmen at an extra rate if they succeed to significantly exceed their 
targets. Naturally there is also a maximum limit for the compensation, but the upper 
limit has been set at very high level, around two times the original budget. Similarly 
also at Company Y, the upper limit is set so high that it mitigates the unwillingness to 
exceed the budgeted targets. Thereby both companies seem to share the view that one 
crucial factor affecting the goal congruence and commitment is the way that the thresh-
olds for incentives are being set. 
Secondly, the problem of low commitment to the organization’s common goal of con-
tinuous improvement is also mitigated through the decentralization of power: it is the 
responsibility of individual business units and regions to formulate the detailed plans 
and find ways how reach the targets given to them. The role of the top management is to 
intervene only if the rolling forecasts start to differ from the budget. More specifically, 
at Company Y, also the managers of the sub-units are authorized to decide on every-
thing related to that business, as long as the decisions happen within the boundaries set 
by the managers of the business unit in question. According to Controller 1, the idea 
behind this delegation of responsibilities is to commit the employees better to the com-
mon organizational goals.  
As the units in both companies are not micromanaged, but instead given freedom to 
operate like individual organizations, the level of trust within the firms is perceived to 
be high. An interesting point of view is given by the Director at Company X as he 
comments that in a large multinational organization, managers do not have enough time 
to rationally prioritize over a large portfolio of initiatives. Instead, trust is the key factor 
behind the decision-making:  
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“The fact that academia easily forgets is that in reality managers have such a limited 
amount of time that one cannot give a comprehensive presentation of some investment pro-
posal to be really evaluated based on facts… …Instead, one presents only highlights of the 
proposal and puts his own, or his sponsor’s, personality and trustworthiness behind the 
recommendation.”    
Finally, one incentive stimulating the continuous performance improvement is the fact 
that the better the units perform, the more they get freedom to make the decisions. In 
other words, if a unit is able to increase its sales beyond the original target, also the tar-
get of the expenditures is stretched accordingly. This naturally applies also vice versa, 
as described by Controller 2 at Company Y:  
 “If it starts to look that we are not going to meet the EBIT-targets, the expenditures are of-
ten fixed to a certain level.”  
6.2.5. Budgets restricting the knowledge sharing 
Finally, budgets are seen to reinforce departmental barriers and to restrict knowledge 
sharing. This problem of having high departmental barriers has been encountered also at 
Company Y, but in the existence of scorecards as a basis of evaluation, Controller 2 
considers it to be more of a question about the determination of appropriate indicators, 
than a problem regarding the use of budgets.  Indeed, previously the company had most-
ly unit-level performance indicators at place, which made the unit managers only to be 
concerned of ensuring that their own unit or sub-units are performing well. This led the 
company having problems with dysfunctional optimization where the units reserved 
resources to themselves, even if it would have been more effective to do internal trans-
fers as Controller 2 at Company Y describes: 
“The units become unwilling to give good employees to other units, or sub-units, even if 
they had no work to offer at the moment. … They wanted to reserve the best resources off 
the chance that new projects would emerge.”  
In order to avoid this inefficiency, more company-level performance measures were 
introduced to encourage the units to strive for what is best for the company as a whole.  
In a more general level, the access to the financial figures is organized in a way that all 
units are able to see the numbers of their peers and thereby make comparisons to each 
other. For example, all managers at Company Y are able to find the budgeted numbers 
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of their peers at their own organizational level. Similarly at Company X, the manage-
ment team and the finance department in each of the business units is able to see their 
own and their peers’ financial figures.  
6.3. Balance between accuracy and workload 
One of the biggest problems related to budget use that is addressed in the literature is 
the difficultness of predicting the volatile future. In other words, foreseeing the external 
changes is difficult and therefore annual budgets often quickly become outdated. This is 
an issue also encountered and underlined in both case companies. Controller 1 at Com-
pany Y argues: 
“One of the main challenges for traditional budgets is the fact that they are formulated to 
cover a whole calendar year. That is a terribly long period of time, as the environment is so 
hectic and the general economic situation can change already after the first quartile has 
passed.”  
The quickly altering environment thus often causes the budgets in both companies to 
differ from the reality, especially when coming close to the year-end. However, the atti-
tude towards reacting to the problem is different: Company X holds on to the budget 
even if the difference would be substantial, whereas Company Y considers such budgets 
to be meaningless and therefore rather formulate a new budget during the year. The re-
formulation of the annual budget is exceptional though and done only if major changes 
in the premises occur.  
The reason for the unwillingness to re-formulate the annual budgets is the additional 
workload that it would cause. Indeed, both case companies subscribe the common criti-
cism of budgets being time consuming to produce, and stress the large number of work-
ing hours that are spent every year. Both companies also acknowledge that the easiest 
way to decrease the workload would be to integrate budgeting to other financial pro-
cesses, and thereby abolish the need for maintaining two simultaneous processes. In 
other words, instead of having two separate processes for forecasting and budgeting, the 
forecast could only be ‘frozen’ once in a year to be the new annual target.  
However, the integration of the processes would naturally cause other problems to 
emerge, as for example the dysfunctional game-playing would not be mitigated that 
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effectively and the accuracy of the forecasts would decrease. Hence, the Director at 
Company X describes this decision to be about balancing between effort and risk: the 
more separated are the processes, the better is the hedge against the game-playing, but 
on the other hand, the more burdened are the employees with work. In fact, Company X 
had previously a half-year budgeting cycle at place, and the Director acknowledges that 
due to the difficultness of predicting the future, there is still a strong desire in the organ-
ization to return back to the old practice, which is still in the organizational memory. 
However, this increased accuracy would come at the cost of increased workload.   
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7. DISCUSSIO
 
This chapter combines the reviewed sets of management control practices, and hence 
compares the ideal features of beyond budgeting to the arrangements made in both 
Statoil and the case companies. In other words, the framework developed in the litera-
ture review is used to analyze the similarities between the three. After comparing the 
organizational arrangements, critical discussion about the radicalism and problems of 
beyond budgeting is given.   
7.1. Comparative analysis of the practices 
The comparative analysis is structured around three groups of control that were included 
in the framework developed earlier: (1) planning, (2) cybernetic control and rewarding, 
and (3) administrative and cultural controls.  
7.1.1. Planning 
Like described in the literature review, the ideal of beyond budgeting suggests that or-
ganizations should separate target setting from planning (Hope et al., 2011; Østergren 
and Stensaker, 2011), as in the existence of traditional budgets the numbers are argued 
to be the same for both uses (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013). On the other hand, the 
basis for the resource allocation is argued to be traditionally done only during the budg-
et negotiations (Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012; Sivabalan et al., 2009), whereas 
beyond budgeting suggests it to be done by a central committee that continuously eval-
uates individual projects through a common set of criteria (Hope et al., 2011, Østergren 
and Stensaker, 2011). 
Having explicitly adopted the principles of beyond budgeting, it is not surprising that 
Statoil follows the idea of separating planning processes precisely; concrete targets that 
reflect the ambitions of the top management are formulated during the spring, whereas 
the separate planning process takes place in the autumn. However, what is perhaps more 
surprising is that also the case companies outside the orbit of beyond budgeting advo-
cates seem to have separated the two proposed elements in a similar way. Indeed, the 
annual budgets are compiled following a top-down approach and are mainly used for 
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target setting, whereas the operational planning and forecasting is done bottom-up in a 
separate process. On the other hand, whereas both case companies are using rolling 
forecasts in their operational planning like proposed in the ideal of beyond budgeting, is 
Statoil using fixed short-term forecasts which envision a fixed end at the end of the pe-
riod. Nevertheless, each of the reviewed organizations seems to follow the idea of being 
action and not explanation oriented, as the variations are sought to be forecasted in ad-
vance; the business follow-up compares forecasts, instead of actual costs, to the prede-
termined targets. 
All the studied companies have also decentralized the authority for resource allocation 
decisions for the units to continuously happen within the boundaries given by the man-
agement. Indeed, instead of micromanaging the units, they are considered to self-
regulate their behavior in accordance to the targets that are given to them. Statoil also 
has several central committees reviewing and giving recommendations regarding the 
largest projects in the fields of technology development, investments, and information 
technology. However, when being analyzed more carefully, it can be argued that this 
arrangement where multiple committees exist does not quite follow the ideal of beyond 
budgeting, where the purpose of such central committee is to ensure that financing is 
given for the overall best projects in the organization. Indeed, each committee at Statoil 
is capable to prioritize only over their own projects, instead of evaluating whether other 
parallel commissions would have better alternatives available. Therefore it can be con-
cluded that despite not being as comprehensive system, the ‘business improvement in-
terlock’ of Company X, where the development projects are being prioritized over the 
boundaries of organization’s internal units, follows the original idea of beyond budget-
ing more closely. Similarly also the fact that the board of directors at Company Y re-
views all the largest projects, can be considered to demonstrate a practice that is rela-
tively equivalent to having a central committee.   
On the other hand, whereas Statoil aims to strictly follow the ideal of beyond budgeting 
and supplements the decentralized action with the help of common set of decision crite-
ria, neither of the case companies have such official NPV or IRR limits for project ap-
provals at place. The Director at Company X specifies two main reasons why creating 
such process that evaluates all the projects against a set of criteria is considered to be 
difficult in practice. Firstly, he argues that as everything depends on the assumptions 
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lying behind the calculations, almost every project can be estimated to show positive 
outcomes, if wanted. And even though the assumptions could be calibrated, the initia-
tives always have differing risk profiles that are difficult to be fairly taken into account. 
The second problem is the finite amount of resources available: the restricted capability 
to invest means that not all profitable projects can be initiated instantly. In other words, 
there might be multiple projects meeting the set of criteria and in that case it comes 
down to the managers of the investing units to decide on which projects should be prior-
itized. Noteworthy is that the descriptions of the practices used at Statoil do not reveal 
how important the common set of decision criteria is in reality, and do not address these 
problems at all.  
Another crucial issue that the literature does not reveal from the resource allocation 
practices of Statoil is that how the decentralized action can take place if no resources are 
granted in advance. In other words, in the absence of budgets, how can the units inde-
pendently decide on anything if no prior financing is given for the year? Therefore one 
can only assume that some kind of anticipatory resource allocation system must be at 
place also at Statoil. Similarly, the case descriptions do not discuss anything about the 
acquirement of back office functions either. Thereby the practice of having internal 
markets as suggested by Hope et al. (2011) cannot be verified to be at place in any of 
the reviewed companies. Related to this, Controller 1 at Company Y admits that even 
though the goal is naturally to do the allocation of the costs as directly as possible, a 
company must always make a compromise between the accuracy and the cost of calcu-
lating them.  
7.1.2. Cybernetic control and rewarding 
The ideal model of organization’s cybernetic control and rewarding in the existence of 
beyond budgeting should be based on relative improvement contracts and benchmark-
ing. On the other hand, balanced scorecards are recommended to be used in order to 
find appropriate financial and non-financial KPIs that reflect the company’s strategy 
(Neely et al., 2003). Finally, the concept stresses that rewarding should be collective 
and also non-financial rewards should be utilized. (Hope et al., 2011; Hansen et al., 
2003) 
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First of all, the performance evaluation of the employees in each of the reviewed organ-
ization is done with the help of scorecards that holistically assess the performance 
through both financial and non-financial KPIs. In other words, despite the case compa-
nies using budgeted numbers to determine the thresholds for financial indicators, the 
rewarding is also based on other strategic non-financial measures. Moreover, both case 
companies seem to have realized the motivating power of employee recognition and 
actively use non-financial rewarding practices, and have also collective bonus systems 
at place. On the other hand, the case descriptions regarding the practices of Statoil are 
again inadequate as they do not reveal how the company determines the appropriate 
target levels for its financial KPIs, or whether there are any non-financial rewarding 
systems at place. What is known though is that Statoil uses group incentives to encour-
age employees to collaborate with each other.   
It is also known that Statoil aims to follow the idea of actively using relative measures 
and benchmarks. However, due to the fact that finding appropriate benchmark data for 
such use is difficult, especially in the lower levels of the organization, the company 
seems to be forced to mainly use only ‘synthetic’ benchmarks. In other words, the units 
are being measured against their own past performance. It can be argued though that 
making such comparisons to one’s past performance cannot be considered as an exam-
ple of orthodox benchmarking, and therefore the company’s internal league standings 
for the health, safety, and environmental issues seem to represent the only real internal 
benchmarking at place. Moreover, as the only reported relative external benchmarking 
is made at the group-level, it can be concluded that despite the keen desire, Statoil’s use 
of relative measures is not as extensive as the company would like to demonstrate.     
Similar conclusions regarding the use of benchmarks are also been made in the case 
companies of this study. Hence, all the interviewees stress the difficultness of finding 
appropriate benchmark data, and thereby take the idea with a grain: neither of the com-
panies thus uses external benchmarks when it comes to the budgeting, with only few 
exceptions of Company X benchmarking the budgeting process itself. Similarly, only 
some unsystematic internal benchmarking is done in both companies as the peers are 
being compared to each other always when applicable. The problem is that most of the 
projects and units are considered to have too different characteristics and premises to be 
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directly benchmarked, and therefore these comparisons are rather done in order to learn 
from the past mistakes and successes, than for the sake of active performance evaluation.  
Finally, it was mentioned that Company X has previously used a certain type of relative 
approach in its group-level management control, as the target setting was based on the 
approximation of the market share percentages. Nevertheless, as the understanding and 
monitoring of the market shares is still considered to be important, the main difference 
to the Statoil’s corresponding practice seems only to be the formality of the system. 
Similarly, even though relative measures are not being formally used in the budgeting 
process of Company Y as such, supplementary calculations with relativistic views are 
reported to be done in order to understand the changes in the markets.     
7.1.3. Administrative and cultural controls 
Finally, an essential part of beyond budgeting ideal deals with radical decentralization 
and empowerment, where the employees are authorized to make decisions independent-
ly without the immediate interaction of group executives (Hansen et al., 2003; Hope et 
al., 2011). And when the traditional command and control –type of management is 
abandoned, the governance of the organization should happen with the help of transpar-
ent and accessible information (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013) and with the accom-
modation of high levels of trust (Hope et al., 2011). 
Both Statoil and the case companies have decentralized the decision power of opera-
tional planning to happen within the boundaries given by the target setting of the man-
agement. In other words, each of the companies seem to have centralized power and 
decentralized actions like proposed in the beyond budgeting literature. Interestingly, as 
the case companies have made this arrangement in order to commit the employees to the 
common organizational goals, their reasoning is rather similar as proposed by Hope et 
al. (2011), who underline that the abandonment of command and control –type of man-
agement makes the employees at all organizational levels to become more committed to 
the strategy. Hence, it seems that both case companies have independently made same 
kind of observations as the advocates of beyond budgeting.  
On the other hand, Statoil has invested a lot to improve its IT systems and nowadays the 
company’s information system aims to make the information as transparent as possible. 
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Similarly, also both case companies have made large investments in IT and enabled 
their units to make comparisons to each other: the managers at Company Y are able to 
find the budgeted numbers of their peers, and correspondingly the management team 
and the finance department in each of the business unit at Company X are able to see 
their own and their peers’ financial figures. Thus, in each of the reviewed organizations, 
the access to the financial figures is organized in a relatively open way, and for example 
the suggested problem of salesmen not knowing the contribution margins of their prod-
ucts (Hope and Fraser, 2003) is non-existent.    
7.2. Observed similarities  
The comparison of the ideal management control system of beyond budgeting, and the 
practices adopted by Statoil and the two case companies, demonstrates significant simi-
larities between the three. Indeed, all of the reviewed organizations seem to have miti-
gated the budget-related problems by complementing their budgeting processes with 
other management control systems in a relatively similar manner as suggested in the 
beyond budgeting literature. What makes this interesting is the fact that both case com-
panies have made all the arrangements independently without any connections to the 
concept of beyond budgeting. Moreover, as both case companies operate in volatile in-
dustries and have been forced to cut costs in order to adapt themselves into the changed 
situation, the findings give evidence that the arguments stating that the ideas of beyond 
budgeting could only be used in stable industries (Libby and Lindsay, 2010) by compa-
nies who have a lot of money (Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012), are at least ques-
tionable. Similarly also Rickard’s (2006) argument of the principles being especially 
unsuitable for manufacturing companies, seems to be debatable.  
The other way around, it seems that despite being an explicit and commonly referred 
beyond budgeting adopter, Statoil has not gone much further on its journey compared to 
the two case companies of this study. Hence, the company’s management control sys-
tem does not meet all the characteristics of an ideal beyond budgeting organization ei-
ther. This is especially true when acknowledging that the use of Statoil’s ‘Ambition to 
Action’ is voluntary, and therefore all the units are not even that beyond the budgets as 
described in this study. Thus, the previous description of the practices represents the 
  
 
 
processes of an ideal unit, whereas there are still multiple units 
more traditional budgeting practices. 
Figure 5 illustrates these observations as it demonstrates which of the ideal practices of 
beyond budgeting have been adopted by the different companies reviewed in this study. 
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Figure 5: Adopted ideal practices of beyond budgeting
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Based on this evidence, it seems that the ideas of beyond budgeting might not be as 
unique and radical as presented by the advocates: both of the case companies in this 
study have faced similar problems as suggested in the budgeting literature, and inde-
pendently made same kind of arrangements to mitigate them as recommended by be-
yond budgeting. Thus, instead of being unable to independently develop their processes 
like assumed in the literature (e.g. Hope and Fraser, 2003), the organizations have been 
much more active in reality. Moreover, the voluntary use of Statoil’s ‘Ambition to Ac-
tion’ means that the group must be capable of fluidly accommodating the practices of 
beyond budgeting to the more traditional budgetary control used in some of the units. 
This even further strengthens the argument of beyond not being that radical as common-
ly suggested in the literature.  
On the other hand, the evidence from the case companies suggests that the common 
thought of beyond budgeting distracting the whole management control system, because 
of the major changes that are needed to the existing practices, seems to be exaggerated. 
Indeed, even though each of the persons interviewed in this study underline that every 
organization always need to have a forecast and some baseline for which to compare the 
performance, none of them consider budgets to be irreplaceable as such. In fact, the 
word ‘budget’ has been in use at Company X only for the past couple of years, as the 
fixed baseline was previously considered to be a certain type of flexible ‘plan’. Howev-
er, the interviewed Director admits that this ‘plan’ was not any more flexible than budg-
ets usually are, also indicating the slight difference between the two. Moreover, the 
suggested role of budgets fulfilling the information need of external parties is down-
played, as Controller 2 at Company Y argues that the information that is included in the 
company interims is not directly based on budgets. And when it comes to financial insti-
tutions such as creditors, Controller 1 comments that it is usually enough to show the 
figures from the balance sheet and hence it is rare that the company would show its pro-
spects in monetary figures.  
Among the advocates of beyond budgeting, the same need for a certain baseline is also 
acknowledged, but instead of using annual budgets, this baseline is recommended to be 
expressed through scorecards. But it can be argued that even though a company would 
be using only scorecards in its management control, it still needs to somehow be able to 
estimate the required target levels for the indicators, in order to measure whether the 
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performance is on sufficient level. Thus, some sort of estimations of the prospects is 
always needed, no matter whether they are called as budgets or not. Similarly Controller 
2 at Company Y underline that a company can never get rid of the need to have a certain 
baseline for the prospects. And even though the baseline would be named differently, it 
is believed that people would eventually start to call it again as a ‘budget’ because the 
word is so embedded in the operations.  
From this point of view, the idea of scorecards representing fundamentally different 
approach to budgets (Bogsnes, 2009) does not seem to be that straightforward. Indeed, 
the coherence of the management processes to systematically assume either central con-
trol or empowerment is not necessarily broken when the ideas of beyond budgeting are 
being connected to the use of traditional budgets, as has been argued by Hope and Fra-
ser (2003). In other words, the coherency of the system depends on the way that the 
budgets are being used: if they are used mainly as a baseline for target setting and the 
planning is decentralized to happen in a separate process, beyond budgeting and annual 
budgets can indeed form a matching set.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that the only ideal feature of beyond budgeting that is 
not adequately used in any of the reviewed organizations, is the use of relative bench-
mark data as a baseline. Unfortunately thus, the solution that beyond budgeting offers to 
the biggest problem addressed by both case companies seems to be the least applicable 
idea in practice: each of the reviewed organizations recognize the need for adaptive cy-
bernetics, but lack both internal and external benchmark data.  
7.3. Weaknesses of beyond budgeting and BBRT 
The discussion above indicates that many of the ideas in beyond budgeting seem to be 
rather applicable, as the two case companies have independently been able to adopt the 
same ideas of complementing budgeting with other management control systems. The 
problem however is that the organizations have introduced the ideas without knowing to 
be following the principles, indicating a possible failure of beyond budgeting to hold 
itself together as a concept. A major reason behind this problem can be argued to be the 
exhaustive ambiguity of the twelve management principles, which fail to give sufficient 
portrayal of the ideas, and thereby restrict the ability to understand what moving beyond 
budgeting really means. The situation has been worsened by the exaggerated and unfo-
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cused stream of promised enduring gains, which the advocating management consult-
ants claim to be available for the implementers. While it has also been discovered that 
one common feature for successful innovations is that they are not too complex to un-
derstand (Rogers, 1995), it is no surprise that beyond budgeting has failed to gain popu-
larity both among the academia and practice (e.g. Becker et al., 2010).  
The vaguely defined principles have also caused studies to criticize the concept with 
flawed arguments that are often based on false understanding of the idea. In other words, 
the critics of beyond budgeting usually have paid no sufficient attention to the practices 
of the adopters and instead, tend to criticize the principles with incomplete arguments 
(e.g. Vaznonienė and Stončiuvienė, 2012; Becker et al, 2010).  This criticism naturally 
has decreased the popularity of beyond budgeting even more.  
7.3.1. Commonly misunderstood features 
First of all, a common conception distorting the discussion is that beyond budgeting is 
considered to be a synonym to abandoning budgets (e.g. Hansen et al., 2003), whilst the 
idea in reality is to abandon only the related problems. In other words, the original pur-
pose of beyond budgeting has been to critically examine the reasons for budget use, and 
thereafter find ways to decrease its role in the business processes (e.g. Hope and Fraser, 
2003). Hence, the question is not about automatically abandoning budgets altogether; all 
the tasks that are traditionally being done with the help of annual budgets are still being 
done, but they are only divided into separate and more holistic processes. It can thus be 
argued that ‘beyond budgeting’ is a misnomer for the concept as it fails to keep the flag 
of the ideology flying. In fact, Robin Fraser, who is one of the creators of beyond budg-
eting, said in an interview, that they originally started to call the ideology as ‘beyond 
budgeting’ even though they did not know what it would eventually be: no budgets, 
more budgets, or something else (Becker et al., 2010). Perhaps partially due to this de-
ceptiveness, some of the recent publications of BBRT (e.g. Hope et al., 2011) tend to 
avoid using the term ‘beyond budgeting’ and rather discuss on building empowered and 
adaptive organizations. However, the original name of the concept seems to have be-
come rooted in the academic discussion. 
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Secondly, beyond budgeting has been stated to be based on total management action 
freedom, and therefore to be unsuitable for control purposes (e.g. Rickards, 2006). 
However, as the idea is that management should closely monitor the rolling forecasts 
against the predetermined targets in order to forecast variations before they occur 
(Neely et al., 2003), and as the units are allowed to operate only within the boundaries 
set by the top management (Hope et al., 2011), the question is definitely not about total 
action freedom. Instead, only the scope of control is widened from pure monetary 
boundaries towards the use of more versatile belief systems. Similarly Hope and Fraser 
(2003b) underline that moving beyond the budgets does not mean abandoning targets 
and trusting that empowered employees will always work to the best of their abilities. 
Instead, empowerment actually requires greater control and is therefore also acknowl-
edged to be dangerous (Simons, 1995).   
The critics of beyond budgeting have also accused the concept for decreasing the ability 
to do operational planning (Hansen, 2011), and simultaneously to undermine manage-
ment’s credibility to provide forward-looking information to stockholders and analysts 
(Rickards, 2006). More specifically, the implementation is considered to be especially 
unsuitable for manufacturing companies, as operating without budgets is thought to lead 
to resource scarcity or overstock. However, beyond budgeting does not suggest aban-
doning planning as it specifically recommends it to be done with the help of rolling 
forecasts, and aims to make the planning more flexible as the forecasts do not envision a 
fixed end at the end of the fiscal year. This fact for some reason is usually ignored, as 
for example Hansen (2011) inconsistently argues that rolling forecasts have a higher 
probability of success than beyond budgeting. On the other hand, the case analysis in 
this study demonstrates that also a manufacturing company (Company X) is able to op-
erate when most of the ideas of beyond budgeting have been implemented. Indeed, the 
problem of overstock was existent particularly under the traditional model of budgeting, 
and was mitigated after the target setting was separated from the planning, like suggest-
ed in the principles of beyond budgeting.  
Finally, beyond budgeting is sometimes argued to focus mainly on the performance 
evaluation function, as it alters the employee compensation schemes from budget-based 
to relative performance contracts (e.g. Hansen, 2011). However, as shown earlier in this 
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study, performance evaluation is only a small part of the entirety of beyond budgeting 
ideology.    
7.3.2. Paradoxality of the principles 
The vaguely defined set of principles however, is not the only problem of beyond budg-
eting. Indeed, as the advocates tend to overemphasize the capability of their ideology, 
they end up making paradoxical arguments which decrease the plausibility of the idea in 
general.  
First paradox relates to the balance between internal co-operation and competition. In-
deed, the principles underline the importance of getting all the employees to collaborate 
and work towards common organizational goals, and thereby emphasize the importance 
of promoting group culture (Henri, 2006). In other words, open information sharing and 
team-work is exhorted, and the employees are encouraged to trust in each other (Hope 
et al., 2011). However, as the performance evaluation and rewarding is recommended to 
be made through internal benchmarking and peer reviews (Hansen et al., 2003), the em-
ployees will perversely be credited if they manage to perform better than their col-
leagues. Thus, as the incentives of the employees are based on the idea of competing 
against the peers, it is probable that information will be rather hided than shared, and the 
emphasized desire to work towards a common goal will most likely decrease. It can 
hence be argued that this requirement for open information sharing and collaboration 
seems to conflict with the simultaneous encouragement to beat the peers in order to be 
rewarded. 
Another paradoxality of the principles relates to the intended decentralization of action 
and the recommended use of central investment committees. More precisely, the radical 
decentralization seems to be one of the most important elements of beyond budgeting, 
as the units are encouraged to be given authority to make all the decisions related to 
reaching the ambitious targets set by the top management. However, it is also recom-
mended that all the resources should be allocated by a central committee continuously 
evaluating the projects against a common set of criteria. In other words, inconsistent 
with the idea of radical decentralization, it is simultaneously recommended that the de-
cision power should be centered around the investment committee. Moreover, it can 
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even be argued that this idea of having central committees fosters an updated version of 
the command-and-control –type of management, only with the exception that the ideas 
of the employees at the lower organizational levels are listened. Thus, it increases the 
level of hierarchy and complicates the decision-making processes, which in fact were 
the major impediments that beyond budgeting originally wanted to get rid of. On the 
other hand, it was also concluded earlier in this study that neither the literature promot-
ing the principles, nor the case descriptions of Statoil reveal how this decentralized ac-
tion can take place if no resources are granted in advance like normally done during the 
budget negotiations. 
Finally, one paradox relates to the promised reduction in the workload needed for main-
taining the financial planning processes. Indeed, Hope and Fraser (2003) argue that the 
implementation of beyond budgeting would increase the time available for running the 
actual business, as the time used for budgeting would decrease even 95%. However, it 
can be argued that in reality, the cumulative amount of work that is needed actually in-
creases, as the different tasks of annual budgets are being divided into separate process-
es that function in parallel with each other. Thus, the formulation of the annual baseline 
may become easier, but the requirement to plan, evaluate, and allocate resources does 
not disappear from the company practices. 
7.3.3. Inconsistency of the advocates  
Finally, when considering the reasons behind the failure of beyond budgeting to remain 
a coherent concept, a lot has to do with the fact that also the advocates themselves are 
still far from being unanimous when it comes to the main content of the principles 
(Becker et al., 2010). For example, even though there has been a certain consensus 
about the idea that beyond budgeting has more to do with the implementation of a new 
management model than with budgeting (Rickards, 2006), there are simultaneously au-
thors explicitly emphasizing the need for complete budget abandonment (e.g. Neely et 
al., 2003). These disagreements have recently started to break the original ideology into 
separate schools of thought, as for example BBRT’s South American branch disengaged 
itself from the others in 2008, and North American branch started to promote its own 
six beyond budgeting principles (Becker et al., 2010). This means that the concept of 
beyond budgeting is not the same around the world.    
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Becker et al. (2010) conclude that one of the reasons behind the controversies is the 
attempt of the original members to keep the concept too strictly together by underlining 
that a company cannot be beyond the budgets, unless each of the twelve principles have 
been introduced. The authors find the trade-off between the concept’s identity and plas-
ticity to potentially work in both directions: while too strong identity might endanger 
the diffusion of a concept, too malleable model risks becoming unrecognizable as one 
and the same idea. Based on the evidence of this study, it seems that beyond budgeting 
might have faced both of these problems. 
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8. CO
CLUSIO
S 
This study has examined the concept of beyond budgeting as a solution to the proposed 
budget-related problems and evaluated its ideas in relation to the entirety of manage-
ment control systems. The purpose of this final chapter is to distill the key findings, and 
to discuss their theoretical contribution. Also the limitations regarding this study are 
being addressed, and finally, avenues for future research presented.  
8.1. Key findings and theoretical contribution  
The aim of this study was to examine and clarify the ambiguous concept of beyond 
budgeting, and to evaluate the applicability and radicalism of its ideas on mitigating the 
budget-related problems. The view from the literature was complemented with empiri-
cal analysis, which focused to comparatively examine how two case companies outside 
the orbit of beyond budgeting advocates have independently used other management 
control systems to complement their budgeting processes in order to find solutions to 
the same problems. Simultaneously, the idealizations of beyond budgeting in relation to 
the organizational reality were being discussed. 
As the previous literature related to the concept of beyond budgeting was concluded to 
be fragmented and conflicting, a framework illustrating the main ideas was built by 
connecting the topic to the literature related to the entirety of management control sys-
tems. More specifically, the analysis was built on the basis of Malmi and Brown’s 
framework, which was considered to provide an appropriate conceptual typology of 
management control systems working as a package for the study. Also other streams of 
academic literature both within and outside management accounting were connected to 
the discussion, as several previously unexplored issues were being critically addressed 
and close convergences to topics such as ‘horizontal organization’ and ‘lateral relations’ 
were found.  
The developed framework illustrates the ideal features of an organization’s entirety of 
management control system in the existence of beyond budgeting through three differ-
ent groups of control. Firstly, under the planning control, beyond budgeting suggests 
that target setting and planning should be separated from each other in order to avoid 
dysfunctional game-playing and to increase the accuracy of the forecasts. On the other 
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hand, the accuracy and flexibility is supposed to be even further increased through the 
suggested use of regularly updated rolling forecasts. The resource allocation decisions 
should be done with the help of common decision criteria, and be reviewed by a central 
investment committee that actively manages the organization’s resource portfolio. Sec-
ondly, the cybernetic control and rewarding should be based on the active use of both 
financial and non-financial relative indicators and benchmarks. The rewarding practices 
should be group-based, and accommodate also non-financial incentives. Finally, the 
administrative and cultural controls mainly focus on the issues related to empowerment 
and decentralization, as the employees are recommended to be authorized to make inde-
pendent decisions without the immediate interaction of the executives. The units are 
trusted to self-regulate themselves effectively through the centralized target setting and 
shared organizational values and objectives.   
Based on the analysis, it was thus summarized that beyond budgeting suggests distin-
guishing all the tasks traditionally assigned to the annual budgets, and on the other hand, 
adjusting the organizational structures to effectively support horizontal relations. More-
over, it was concluded that as the organizations can never get rid of the need to have a 
certain baseline, the question should therefore be more about moving beyond the prob-
lems of budgeting, instead of moving beyond the budgets altogether. On the other hand, 
it was argued that even though the journey towards beyond budgeting is usually de-
scribed to be a two stage process, where the budgetary design is first altered and then 
radical decentralization takes place (e.g. Hansen, 2003), the steps should be considered 
rather inseparable as the budgetary design should always reflect the particular organiza-
tional design at place.   
After clarifying the main ideas of beyond budgeting, the empirical part of this study 
concentrated on examining the radicalism and applicability of the principles. More spe-
cifically, the arrangements that the two Finnish publicly listed companies have inde-
pendently made to mitigate the budget-related problems were being analyzed and com-
pared. The discussion was further enriched, as also the practices of the most commonly 
referred recent beyond budgeting adopter were being reviewed and connected to the 
analysis. Interestingly, it was found that all the organizations have made rather similar 
arrangements to their management control processes, and hence have mitigated the 
budget-related problems largely in a similar way as suggested in the beyond budgeting 
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literature. On the other hand, it was also concluded that not even the practices of the 
explicit adopter meet all the ideal features of beyond budgeting. 
The extensive literature review and the alternative approach to the empirical analysis 
gave fruitful basis for discussions evaluating the applicability of the ideas of beyond 
budgeting in relation to the organizational reality. Indeed, it was concluded that most of 
the ideas seem to have real managerial relevance, as the case companies have already 
been able to introduce them into their practices. However, it was also found that unfor-
tunately beyond budgeting is unable to answer to the most important dilemma addressed 
by both case companies, as the idealization of available benchmarks disconnects the 
concept of adaptive cybernetics from the world of organizations’ practice. Thus, the 
lack of information related to competitors, and the difficultness of finding comparable 
units inside the organization, makes proper benchmarking difficult in practice. This ap-
plies especially in the lower levels of the organization. 
On the other hand, as the most applicable ideas are already being in use, it suggests that 
in contrast to common conception in the literature, the ideas of beyond budgeting might 
not be that revolutionary at all. Indeed, as it was also found that most of the feasible 
ideas are already presented under other streams of literature, it can even be argued that 
the applicable beyond budgeting principles are only summarizing the issues already 
addressed within the fields of organizational theory, management accounting, and man-
agement. For example, the idea of striving for continuous improvement and customer 
orientation through flattened structures and a team-based focus is also captured under 
the concept of horizontal organization. Also the arguments of Simons (1995) seem to 
reflect the idea of separating target setting from planning, as he underlines that while the 
motivation of the subordinates requires having stretch targets, are the most probable 
outcomes required for planning purposes. This critical perspective to beyond budgeting 
is in line with Vaivio’s (2008) argument, as he underlines that the consultancy views of 
management accounting in general tend to draw on a vocabulary of reform combined 
with selectively documented ‘success stories’, where a closer examination of these new 
practices reveals that they often make only minor refinements to the existing practices, 
or achieve only local changes. Similarly also Otley (2008) argues that despite the in-
creased amount of innovations in management accounting during the past two decades, 
some of these can be considered simply as ‘old wine in new bottles’. 
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The findings of this study also address important questions regarding the previous re-
search concluding that organizations in general are more interested in developing their 
budgeting practices, than moving beyond the budgets. Indeed, in the light of this study, 
it remains unclear how these two choices differ from each other: if a company separates 
its forecasting process from the annual budgets and begins to use scorecards and non-
financial measures in its rewarding systems, is it then developing its budgeting process-
es, or moving beyond the budgets? Anyway, as both examined case companies were 
using their entirety of management control systems to complement budgeting, the 
common assumption in the beyond budgeting literature of budgets operating in isolation 
(e.g. Hope and Fraser, 2003), does not necessarily seem to reflect the reality of today.  
Similarly, the truth about the prior studies underlining that only very few companies 
have been able to implement the ideas of beyond budgeting (e.g. Becker et al., 2010) 
might not be that straightforward. For example, if this study was done as a questionnaire, 
both case companies would have identified themselves to be the users of traditional 
budgets. Indeed, it was only the closer examination that revealed them to exploit most 
of the ideas suggested in beyond budgeting. Moreover, as the actual content of the con-
cept differs between the advocating organizations, the questionnaires of the popularity 
might become even more skewed: if the examination is done in accordance to the Euro-
pean BBRT standards, the results are different than if the study was done in accordance 
to the US set of principles. Thus, in contrast to the common conception, beyond budget-
ing is not a one single concept, like for example balanced scorecard is.   
Finally, it should be underlined that even though the perspective of the discussion in this 
study has been relatively theoretical, this study provides also managerial contribution to 
the practical world. Indeed, as the vast majority of organizations are reported to aim for 
budgetary process improvements, are the ideas of beyond budgeting worth paying atten-
tion. But when considering introducing the principles reviewed in this study, one must 
be cautious: the budgetary design should always reflect the most important issues of a 
particular organization, and is always dependent on the organizational context (Hansen, 
2011). Therefore managers need to be aware of the possible cultural or contextual fac-
tors restraining the applicability of the ideas.  
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8.2. Limitations 
Despite the relatively bold interpretation of the observations, the conclusions of this 
study are naturally subject to several limitations. First of all, albeit being a commonly 
recognized typology, the decision to develop the framework illustrating the key ele-
ments of beyond budgeting on the basis of Malmi and Brown’s (2008) study may cause 
the analysis to downplay some of the aspects. Secondly, the empirical part was based on 
analyzing only two case companies and thereby the conclusions cannot be generalized 
in a statistical sense. Furthermore, as the nature of building planning and control sys-
tems is contingent upon the organizational context and a specific time frame, the results 
may change rather quickly.  
On the other hand, also the decision to interview only people in the higher level of the 
organizational hierarchy may cause the study to fail to observe the reality of the em-
ployees and unit managers. For example, as the conclusions regarding the level of em-
powerment were done through the analysis of the organizational processes, instead of 
addressing direct questions to the employees at lower levels of the organization, the 
perceptions of the employees might differ from the reported. In other words, the empiri-
cal case analysis might reflect a sort of a description of an ideal organizational reality 
perceived by the interviewees.  
Finally, as Scapens (1990) argues, there is no such thing as objective case study, and the 
natural bias of the researcher always effects on the achieved results. Thus, the research-
er’s initial objective of critically examining the beyond budgeting-related issues, might 
make this study subject to exaggerated interpretation of the observations. On the other 
hand, even though the researcher did not have any personal connections to the studied 
case companies, the researcher’s own reflexivity in the interactive conversations with 
the company representatives might have affected on the results (Parker, 2012).  
8.3. Avenues for future research 
The analysis done in this study offers several fruitful avenues for future research. First 
of all, whereas this study presents its empirical findings based on only two case compa-
nies and does not aim to generalize the findings in a statistical sense, it gives the build-
ing blocks for future studies to lean on, when examining these issues with larger popula-
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tion. In other words, a researcher might study whether the findings regarding the case 
companies of this study are only exceptions, or also applicable for other large compa-
nies. Important is to understand that when studying this topic with questionnaires, a 
researcher should concentrate on the decisions regarding top-down versus bottom-up 
budgeting approaches, and more specifically, look for causalities between the different 
budget practices and budget formulation processes in accordance to this study. Is the 
forecasting usually done following a bottom-up approach? And respectively, does the 
annual ‘baseline’ follow a top-down formulation process? On the other hand, a re-
searcher should aim to find out whether the forecasting and planning processes are sepa-
rated from each other and function complementing each other.      
Secondly, this study proposed the principles of beyond budgeting to include several 
inconsistencies, and concluded that the existing case descriptions of the explicit 
adopters do not cover these issues comprehensively enough. Therefore it would be in-
teresting to interview those organizations and find out how they have dealt with the in-
consistencies. For example, how is the collision between organization’s internal co-
operation and competition mitigated?  Or has the amount of work really decreased after 
the introduction of the principles, even when summing up all the processes that are now 
done individually?  
Finally, the analysis of the case companies in this study revealed that both organizations 
have difficulties in predicting the future, and that the recommended idea of using rela-
tive benchmarks is problematic in practice. Thereby, a study focusing on different inno-
vative ways to carry out the organization’s cybernetic control offers many exciting ave-
nues for research. There is also an acknowledged need among the academia for such 
studies, which focus on the external context of an organization, rather than only concen-
trating on internal activities (e.g. Otley, 1999).  For example, one interesting suggestion 
that emerged during the preparation of this study was the use of scenario-based financial 
planning and target setting. Could the altering environment be taken into account with 
different scenarios? If so, what kind of requirements for the information systems would 
be needed to support the system? On the other hand, a researcher could also try to un-
derstand the preconditions for successful relative benchmarking and ask if there are any 
industries where competitor data is available.  
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Anyway, the complexity of examining beyond budgeting in relation to the entirety of 
management control systems is challenging, but also exciting and therefore future re-
searchers should be encouraged to participate in the development of the ideas pro-
pounded in this study. It is probable that studies in this field will become more popular, 
as the academic papers are concluded often to follow behind the management account-
ing innovations developed by practitioners (Kasanen et al., 1993).  
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Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
Director, Business Planning and Analysis, Company X  ̴  60min,  25.9.2013. 
Business Controller 1, Company Y ̴  60min, 18.9.2013. 
Business Controller 2, Company Y  ̴  60min, 18.9.2013. 
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Appendix 2: Interview structure 
 
Theme 1: Background information of the interviewee 
• Came, title, working history, current job description 
• Familiarity with the concept of beyond budgeting 
 
Theme 2: Budgeting and forecasting in general 
• Different time perspectives 
• Responsibilities 
• Top-down versus bottom-up 
 
Theme 3: Reasons for budget use 
• Planning 
• Forecasting 
• Target setting 
• Performance evaluation 
• Other reasons 
 
Theme 4: Perceived problems of budgeting 
• Different forms of dysfunctional game-playing 
• Time consumption 
• Inflexibility 
• Difficultness of predicting the future 
 
Theme 5: Other issues  
• Use of non-financial indicators (balanced scorecards) 
• Benchmarking and relative indicators 
• Organizational structure 
• Thoughts on the budget abandonment 
 
 
 
